Volume 86
Issue 2 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 86,
1981-1982
1-1-1982

After Mattos v. Thompson-The Future of Pennsylvania's Health
Care Services Malpractice Act
Stuart A. Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Stuart A. Law, After Mattos v. Thompson-The Future of Pennsylvania's Health Care Services Malpractice
Act, 86 DICK. L. REV. 313 (1982).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol86/iss2/4

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

After Mattos v. Thompson-The
Future of Pennsylvania's Health
Care Services Malpractice Act
I.

Introduction

After repeated attacks on the constitutionality of the Health
Care Services Malpractice Act (Act 111), 1 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court invalidated section 309 of the Act in Aatos v. Thompson.2
The court removed the original and exclusive jurisdiction granted to
medical malpractice arbitration panels by section 309 because the
delay in processing claims under the arbitration system denied plaintiffs their right to a speedy jury trial. By refusing to invalidate the
entire Act, the court left an elaborate administrative structure in
place and made resort to the administrative process optional with the
parties to a malpractice claim.
The arbitration process established by Act 111 was part of a
complex statutory scheme designed to end the medical malpractice
insurance crisis in Pennsylvania, which became acute in 1975.1 Specifically, Pennsylvania's crisis was precipitated by the Argonaut Insurance Company's announced intention to stop underwriting
malpractice policies.4 Act 111 was intended to make malpractice insurance available at reasonable rates to all health care providers in
the Commonwealth.
1. Act of Oct. 15, 1975, P.L. 390, No. 111, §§ 101-1006 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
40, § 1301.101-.1006 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81)). See notes 30-67 and accompanying text infra.
2. 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980).

3. A growing number of commentators question the genuineness of the medical malpractice insurance crisis. These commentators believe that insurance companies have played
the critical role in the creation and continuation of this major problem, and have turned crisis
into profit. See, e.g., J. GUINTHER, THE MALPRACTrrIONERS (1976); Aiken, Medical Ma/praclice. The Alleged "Crisis"in Perspective, 1976 INs. L.J. 90; Charbonneau, MedicalMalpractice
Crisirs. Fact or Fiction?, 3 ORANGE CoUNTY B.J. 136 (1976); Cunningham & Lane, Malpractice-The Illusory Crisi, 54 FLA. B.J. 114 (1980); Fuchsberg, Myths ofMedicalMalpractice, 11
TRIAL L.Q. 49 (1976); Sepler, ProfessionalMalpracticeLitigation Crises; Dangeror Distortion?,
15 FORUM 493 (1980).
4. Argonaut contended that the increasing volume of malpractice claims, sizeable jury
awards, and large settlements combined to make writing malpractice insurance unprofitable.
The Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner temporarily averted Argonaut's withdrawal by approving its request for a 207% increase in premium rates. That decision made malpractice
insurance available for the State's physicians, but only for those who could afford to pay the
exorbitant rates. Argonaut's actions in Pennsylvania are described in Note, MedicalMapraclice-A Question of Insurability, 80 DICK. L. REv. 594 (1976).

Under Act 11, maintenance of a malpractice insurance market
was to be accomplished by substantive changes in tort law,' in insurance practice,6 and in malpractice claim resolution.' Claims against
health care providers were to be handled by Arbitration Panels for
Health Care8 similar to those established in twenty-five other states. 9
It was anticipated that the arbitration process would provide an inexpensive, speedy alternative to traditional litigation.
The arbitration system unfortunately failed to accomplish its
designed objectives. Act 111 established a cumbersome administra-

tive process that created an enormous backlog of cases. The delay in
processing claims only exacerbated the problems that initially contributed to the medical malpractice insurance crisis, and this eventually led to the decision in Mattos v. Thompson.
At present, Act 111 mandates Arbitration Panels for Health

Care, but only for those parties who voluntarily submit their claims
to the panels. Voluntary medical malpractice mediation panels, in
Pennsylvania as well as in other states, have proven to be underutilized systems that are incapable of solving the problems affecting the
5. The changes in tort law were designed to decrease the incidence of malpractice
claims and the total liability imposed against health care providers for their negligent acts. See
notes 31-35 and accompanying text infra.
6. See notes 35-45 and accompanying text infra.
7. Act 11 established both the Joint Underwriting Association, which provides insurance to high risk physicians, and the Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund,
which eases the burden imposed upon insurance companies by enormous jury awards and
claims that are resolved long after the negligent act is committed. See notes 36-45 and accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 47-67 and accompanying text infra. Technically, the Pennsylvania Legislature mislabeled the panel system. The terms "screening panel" and "arbitration panel" are
often confused, but the distinction between the two is important. Arbitration boards provide
final, binding determinations and are actual substitutes for trials. Screening panel determinations are purely advisory and are intended to educate the parties on the merits of their case.
Although Pennsylvania's pretrial procedure is labeled "arbitration," the service provided by
the panel is "screening". Throughout this comment, the term "arbitration" will be used to
refer to Pennsylvania's pretrial screening system.
9. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535 (Supp. 1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567 (Supp.
1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-2601 to 34-2612 (Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 68036814 (Supp. 1978); HAWAn REV. STAT. §§ 671.1 to 671.20 (1976 & Supp. 1979); IDAHO CODE
§§ 6-1001 to 6-1013 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9.5-9-1 to 16-9.5-9-10 (Bums Supp. 1980);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-4901 to 65-4908 (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47 (West 1979
& Supp. 1979); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-01 to 3-2A-09 (Supp. 1980);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West Supp. 1981); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 171301 to 17-1315 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2840 to 44-2847 (1978); NEv. REV. STAT.
§§ 41A.010-41A.095 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-5-1 to 41-5-28 (1978); N.Y. JUD. LAW
§ 148-a (McKinney Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-19-1 to 10-19-10 (Supp. 1978); S.D.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 21-25B-1 to 21-25B-26 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-26-101 to 29-26121 (1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 7001-8 (Supp. 1981); VA. CODE §§ 8.01-581.1 to 8.01581.20 (1977 & Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 655.02 - 655.21 (West 1980). Five other states
have attempted to establish mediation panels for medical malpractice claims, but they have
been ruled unconstitutional on various grounds by state courts. Aldana v. Holub, - Fla. -, 381
So. 2d 231 (1980); Wright v. Central Dupage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 II1. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736
(1976); State ex rel Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d
107 (Mo. 1979); Carson v. Maurer, - N.H. -, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Simon v. St. Elizabeth
Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 163, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976).

malpractice insurance industry. Because recent statistics indicate the
possibility of a new malpractice crisis,"0 it is imperative that the arbitration provisions of Act 111 be amended to create a mediation sys-

tem that processes claims in an efficient, expeditious manner. This
comment engages in a retrospective analysis of Act 111 in light of the

constitutional scrutiny exercised by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, examines the overall impact of the Act on the malpractice

insurance market in Pennsylvania, and suggests recommendations
for an improved arbitration system that will be more likely to accomplish the goals of the General Assembly.
The Pennsylvania Legislature's Response to the Medical

II.

Malpractice Insurance Crisis of 1975
A.

Background
The medical malpractice insurance market is quite different

from any other insurance market.I' In comparison to fire and casualty underwriting, the medical malpractice insurance market is con-

trolled by a small group of companies. The malpractice coverage
written by these few companies constitutes only a small portion of
their total volume of casualty underwriting.' 2 Thus, medical malpractice policy writing constitutes only a small fraction of the entire
insurance industry and, accordingly, risk pooling is made more

difficult. 13
In the early 1970s, diversified insurance companies left the med-

ical malpractice insurance market to concentrate on more profitable

underwriting.' 4 The undiversified companies remaining in the market were left especially vulnerable because they lacked alternative
sources of income to subsidize their losses.' 5 These companies
claimed that the increased frequency of malpractice suits' 6 combined
10. See notes 68-85 and accompanying text infra.
11.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 605-08

(1973) [hereinafter cited as SECRETARY'S REPORT]. See generally King, Commentary on the
Report of the Malpractice Commirsion, 29 RECORD 294 (1975).
12. Oster, Medical Malpractice Insurance, 45 INS. COUNSEL J. 228 (1978).
13. See T. LOMBARDI, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 6 (1978). See generally
Note, Study of Medical Malpractice Insurance: Maintaining Rates and Availability, 9 IND. L.
REV. 594 (1976).
14. Employers Mutual of Wausau, the principal malpractice insurer in New York for
twenty-five years, terminated its liability coverage in that state in July 1974. In 1972, Employers Mutual lost 120 million dollars in claims against its 23,000 insured members of the medical
society of New York. Argonaut Insurance Company replaced Employers Mutual and subsequently abandoned their coverage of physicians in July 1975. Epstein, Medical Malpractice:
The Case For Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 87.
15. Poor business judgment by many of the insurers who remained in the malpractice
insurance market exacerbated their losses. Id See SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 11, at 6.
16. The largest medical malpractice insurance company in the United States reported
that in 1969 it received one claim for every twenty-three doctors it insured. By 1974, the ratio
had fallen to one in every ten physicians, which represents a 139% rise in claim incidence.
Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform Al Preliminary Analysir, 36 MD. L. REV. 490 (1977).

with exorbitant jury awards 7 made writing malpractice insurance
unprofitable. Moreover, the "long tail" on medical malpractice
claims made it impossible for insurers to cover their losses by charging adequate premiums. The term "long tail" is used by insurers to
describe the amount of time that passes between payment of malpractice insurance premiums and final disposition of a malpractice
claim." Because of the complexity of medical malpractice cases19
and court congestion, it normally takes longer to dispose of claims,
and consequently insurance companies find it difficult to determine
adequate rate structures.20
By 1975, the medical malpractice crisis gained national prominence 2' and physicians across the country complained that they were
unable to obtain insurance at rates they considered to be reasonSee generally Probert, Nibbling at the Problems of MedicalMalpracice, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 56
(1975).
17. The average amount paid in settlement or judgment of malpractice suits increased
steadily from 1968 to 1974. The St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company estimated a
117% increase over that time period. See P. CARLIN, infra note 22, at 10. But see SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 11, at 10-11. Many physicians maintain that large jury awards are
attributable, in part, to juries' inability to understand complex medical cases, and their sympathetic reaction to injured plaintiffs. See R. GoTs, THE TRUTH ABOUT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 121-74 (1975).
18. It takes a long time to resolve a medical malpractice case. In 1973, the Secretary's
Commission estimated that only one-half are resolved within eighteen months after they are
filed. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 11, at 11. Cases involving medical injuries typically
have an extraordinarily long delay between the actual incident and the date at which the injury
is perceived and litigation ensues. Green, Medical Malpracticeand the Propensity To Litigate,
in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 193, 196 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1978). Moreover,
the litigation itself is complex and time consuming. One commentator estimates that an attorney must spend at least 67 hours preparing a malpractice case. Shayne, Meritless Malpractice
Cases: A Fragile Dilemma, II TRIAL 29 (July/Aug. 1975). See generally Blaut, The Medical
Malpractice Crisis-Its Causes and Future, 44 INS. COUNSEL J. 114, 119 (1977).
19. Green, Medical Malpractice and The Propensity To Litigate, in THE ECONOMICS OF
MEDICAL PRACTICE 193, 196-97 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1978).
20. Medical malpractice insurers learn of only 52% of the claims against their clients
within one year of the accident. Even after four years, 4% of the claims are still outstanding.
Consequently, the malpractice insurer has no substantive knowledge of its total exposure when
projecting the rates that must be charged for the next year. The insurer is forced to estimate
the cost of the unknown claims. J. GUINTHER, supra note 3, at 173.
21. The magnitude of the malpractice insurance dilemma was recognized by President
Richard Nixon in his 1971 Health Message to Congress. The President directed the Secretary
of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to convene a Commission on Medical
Malpractice. The Commission examined claim incidence, insurance rates, medical injuries,
and the malpractice dispute resolution system. In January 1973 the Commission submitted its
report, which confirmed the President's fear that a malpractice insurance crisis was imminent.
The creation of a Federal Commission to study the problems of medical malpractice
is ample evidence of the importance of the subject to society. We are not dealing
with a matter of concern only to a few relatively aggrieved patients and the doctors
and hospitals they sue. We are dealing with a problem of national concern that vitally affects the way in which health care is rendered in this country. The malpractice
problem is like a proliferation of cancerous cells which has spread throughout the
health care system. Its consequences, as noted by the President, are indeed profound.
SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 11, at 4.
One unfortunate consequence of the malpractice insurance crisis is the deterioration of
the doctor-patient relationship. Id at 67-82. See Blaut, The Medical Malpractice Crisis--Its
Causes and Future, 44 INS. COUNSEL J. 114 (1977).

able.22 Hearings and studies conducted by state governments and a
federal commission 23 revealed numerous factors that contributed to
the dramatic increase in the cost of medical care and, consequently,
to the increase in jury awards and insurance premiums. These factors included, inter alia, high court costs and attorney fees, 24 the in-

creasing availability of a cause of action against health care
providers for lack of informed consent, 25 long statutes of limita-

tion,26 the application of res ipsa loquitur to malpractice cases,27 and
22. Doctors and hospitals in the United States paid between 1.5 and 1.75 billion dollars
in premiums for their malpractice insurance policies in 1976. In 1960, doctors and hospitals
paid only 61.6 million dollars in premiums. J. GUINTHER, supra note 11, at 17. Nationally,
average premiums for doctors increased two-fold from 1974 to 1977. In 1974, for example, the
cost of malpractice insurance ranged from $583 for a primary care physician who performed
no surgery to $3,527 for orthopedic surgeons. By 1977, premiums for these same groups soared
to $1,544 and $9,392 respectively. P. CARLIN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PRE-TRIAL SCREENING
PANELS: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 10 (1980); Greenspan,A DescriptiveAnalysis o(/Medical
MalpracticeInsurancePremiums, 1974-1977, 1 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 65-71 (1979).
In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, physicians paid an average annual premium increase of
13% from 1971 to 1974. Intriligator & Kehrer, An Econometric Model of MedicalMalpractice,
in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 87, 101 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1978). A major
teaching hospital in Philadelphia had its premiums increased from 245 thousand dollars in
1974 to 1.5 million dollars in 1975. J. GUINTHER, Take Two Affidavits and Call Me in the
Morning, Philadelphia Magazine (May 1976).
Rising malpractice premiums continue to command a larger proportion of the physician's
income. In 1970, approximately 1.34% of a doctor's gross income went to the purchase of
malpractice policies. By 1976, an estimated 6.68% of gross income was used to purchase insurance. Steves, A Proposalto Improve the Cost to Benefti RelationshipsIn the Medical ProfessionalLiabilityInsuranceSystem, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1305, 1318. Confronted with a considerable
increase in their insurance rates, physicians passed the increased costs to their patients. In
1970, .5% of money spent on health care in America paid for malpractice premiums. In 1976,
premiums represented 1.5% of total health care expenditures. It was estimated that in 1980
more than 2.5% of all money spent on health care went toward malpractice premiums. Id at
1317. One statistical study indicated that doctors more than pass on increased insurance costs.
Doctors' fees rise by 9.1 percent for every 100percent increase in doctors' premiums
when these premiums represent only about 4 percent of total costs, and hospital
prices rise by 8.9 percent for every 100 percent increase in hospital premiums when
these premiums represent less than 1 percent of total costs.
Greenwald & Mueller, MedicalMalpracticeand Medical Costs, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, 65, 82 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1978).
23. See note 12 supra,
24. One commentator estimates that over one-fifth of the dollar settlements in malpractice cases is attributable to payments of plaintiffs' legal fees. J. Green, MedicalMalpracticeand
the Propensity to Litigate, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 193, 197 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1978). See SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 11, at 34; Sheehan, MedicalMalpractice
Crisis in Insurance." How It Happenedand Some ProposedSolutions, 11 FORUM 80 (1975).
25. The doctrine of informed consent is subject to abuse when it imposes an unreasonable responsibility upon the physician. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 11, at 29. See generally Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 137 (1977);
Meisel, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment- An Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. Pr-r.
L. REv. 407 (1980); Scaletta, Informed Consent and Medical Malpractice: Where Do We Go
From Here, 10 MAN. L.J. 289 (1980); Note, supra note 4, at 596.
26. In order for an object or event to be insurable, the insurer must be able to measure
with certainty the time, place, and amount of harm. Insurance is premised upon the theory
that similar risks can be combined and spread among many to render the probable loss from
such risks predictable. Premium rates covering the risks can then be determined. If, however,
the time, place, and amount of harm caused by a hazard cannot be calculated, insurance companies must charge excessive premiums to accumulate abundant reserves for guaranteed protection. See Note, supra note 4, at 604-05.
Most states have fixed statutes of limitation for contract actions. Pennsylvania, for example, has a six year statute. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5526 (Purdon Pamphlet 1980-81). The

defensive medicine.28 With these factors in mind, each state legislature sought to resolve the crisis.
B.

The Health Care Services MalpracticeAct of 1975 (Act 111)

The Pennsylvania General Assembly's attempt to remedy the
malpractice crisis is embodied in the Health Care Services Malpractice Act of 1975. The comprehensive Act instituted changes in tort
law, insurance practice, professional discipline, 29 and malpractice

adjudication.30

majority of states, however, refuse to apply a fixed limitation period to malpractice actions that
are based upon an implied contract theory because the plaintiff could then be limited to recovery of contract damages. Fala, The Law fMedical Malpracticein Pennsylvania, 36 U. PITT. L.
REV. 203, 231 n.148 (1974). Accordingly, the two year tort statute of limitations has generally
been applied to medical negligence cases. Moreover, most jurisdictions hold that the statute of
limitations does not begin to run until the patient discovers the wrong or through the exercise
of reasonable diligence should have discovered it, the rationale being that most medical
wrongs do not manifest themselves until several years after the negligence has been committed. See, e.g., Ragan v. Steen, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 515, 331 A.2d 724 (1974).
The effect of a latent period on insurance companies is severe. Because malpractice insurance is sold on an occurrence basis, malpractice underwriters must wait years to compute their
total losses for any given period, thus making it impossible to determine future premium and
reserve needs based on past experience. Note, supra note 4, at 606. See generally Letvin, In
Search of he Spirit of Llpsey: Discovery of Malpractice andthe Statute of Limitations, 1978 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 345; Note, MedicalMalpractice Statute of Limitations as Special Legislation, 55
CHI-KENT L. REV. 519 (1979).
27. The extension of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to rare medical accidents allows the
question of negligence to be put to a jury on the basis of limited circumstantial evidence,
without any expert testimony showing that the accused physician actually departed from the
accepted standards of care. Those who argue that this is unfair to the physician overlook the
difficulty some patients experience in obtaining evidence of physician negligence, particularly
when that negligence has occurred while the patient is admitted to a hospital. See generally
Podell, Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur in MedicalMapracticeLitigation, 44 INS. COUNSEL J.
634 (1977).
28. Positive defensive medicine is the conducting of a test or performance of a diagnostic or therapeutic procedure which is not medically justified but is carried out
primarily (if not solely) to prevent or defend against the threat of medical-legal liability. . . . Negative defensive medicine occurs when a physician does not perform a
procedure or conduct a test because of the physician's fears of a later malpractice
suit, even though the patient is likely to benefit from the test or procedure in
question.
SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 11, at 14. Some analysts calculate that the largest malpractice cost to the public, exceeding even the cost of transferred insurance premiums, is the cost of
defensive medicine. See A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 407 (2d ed. 1978); SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 11, at 105; Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of
Defensive Medicine, 1971 DUKE L.J. 939, 942. But see J. GuINTHER, supra note 3, at 22-24.
See generally C. WOOD, THE INFLUENCE OF LITIGATION ON MEDICAL PRACTICE (1977).
29. Act 111 mandates the State Board of Medical Education and Licensure to employ a
sufficient number of attorneys and investigators to fully implement its disciplinary authority.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.901 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). The Act further augments the
Board's disciplinary authority by providing that all fees, charges, and fines collected from physicians shall be retained by the Board for its exclusive use. Id § 1301.907.
30. Abrahams, Medical Malpractice Litigation: The Arbitration Approach, 47 PA. B.Q.
495 (1976). The specific objectives of Act 11 include the following: (1) to decrease the length
of time between the purchase of insurance and a malpractice claim; (2) to upgrade health care;
(3) to provide medical malpractice insurance for all health care providers; (4) to facilitate settlements; (5) to create a system for quick resolution of claims; (6) to promote stricter professional discipline of negligent physicians; (7) to cut the cost of court and attorney fees.

1 Changes in Pennsylvania Tort Law.-Act Il l substantially
changed tort law to decrease the total cost borne by insurance companies for each malpractice claim. Pennsylvania adheres to the "collateral source" rule, which provides that a defendant is not entitled
to have damages reduced by proof that the plaintiff has received or
will receive indemnity for loss from an independent source. 3 ' The
rule effectively permits injured plaintiffs to recover damages for their
injuries several times from different sources. Under Act 111, however, damages awarded in any medical malpractice case are reduced
by any public, collateral source of compensation. 2
In addition, Act 111 explicitly states that absent a special written
contract, a health care provider is neither a warrantor nor a guarantor of a cure. 3 That provision precludes the application of a strict
liability in tort theory to medical negligence cases. The rule does not
effect a great change in common law, however, because a majority of
courts have recognized that the uncertainties in the practice of
medicine and surgery are such that no practitioner can be required
to guarantee results.34 The law only demands that the physician apply that degree of skill, care, knowledge, and attention ordinarily
possessed and exercised by medical practitioners under like
circumstances.3 5
2. Insurance Mechanisms.-One of the more controversial issues facing the General Assembly concerned the statute of limitations.a6 Manipulation of the statute of limitations was believed to be
an effective way to mitigate the effect of the "long tail" in medical
malpractice cases.3a One alternative considered was a six year time
limit, measured from the date of the negligent medical treatment."8
A provision of that nature, however, would leave many injured
plaintiffs without a means for redress.39 Instead, the General Assembly adopted a better alternative.4' The Act retains the two year statute of limitations, 4 ' but for a claim filed more than four years after
the occurrence, any award is paid entirely from the newly created
31. See Kagarise v. Shover, 218 Pa. Super. Ct. 287, 275 A.2d 855 (1971).
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.602 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). That section further provides that "[a] right of subrogation is not enforceable against any benefit or compensation
awarded under this act or against any health care provider or its liability insurer." Id
33. Id § 1301.606.
34. See, e.g., Zotterell v. Repp, 187 Mich. 319, 330, 153 N.W. 692, 695 (1915).
35. Id
36. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
37. See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
38. See note 26 supra.
39. Id
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.605 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
41. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5524 (Purdon Pamphlet 1980-81).

Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund.4 2 This latter
provision insures that carriers will not be liable for any claim filed
more than four years after injury, thereby allowing the insurance industry to more accurately determine risk exposure and rate structure.
At the same time, the Act insures that victims of medical negligence
will be compensated for their injuries.
In addition to the Catastrophe Loss Fund, Act 111 meets the
problem of the unavailability of malpractice insurance by establishing a Joint Underwriting Association to ensure that professional liability insurance will be available to health care providers who cannot
"conveniently obtain insurance through ordinary methods at rates
not in excess of those applicable to similarly situated health care
providers under the plan."43 Each practicing physician in Pennsylvania is required to carry professional liability insurance in the
amount of one hundred thousand dollars per occurrence and three
hundred thousand dollars per annual aggregate." Any award of
damages above the basic limit requirements is paid from the Catastrophe Loss Fund.4 5
3. Adjudication of Medical Malpractice Claims.-The major
portion of Act Ill addresses the problems of expense and delay incurred in malpractice adjudication. One provision places limits on
contingent fees charged by attorneys," and the remaining provisions
create Arbitration Panels for Health Care. The latter is designed to
promote settlement of claims before trial and quick resolution of litigated claims. The substance of the arbitration provisions is set forth
below.
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.605 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). The Catastrophe Loss
Fund is established pursuant to § 1301.701.
43. Id § 1301.801. The Joint Underwriting Association is analogous to the high risk
pool for auto insurance in the Commonwealth. The Association consists of all insurers authorized to write malpractice insurance in Pennsylvania. The plan provides for equitable appor-

tionment of the financial burden incurred in the operation of the Joint Underwriting
Association.
44. Id § 1301.701. Hospitals located in the Commonwealth are required to be insured in
the amount of $100,000 per occurrence and $300,000 per annual aggregate. The constitutionality of requiring physicians to carry insurance has been questioned. See, e.g., McCoy v. Pa.
Bd. of Medical Educ. and Licensure, 37 Pa. Commnw. Ct. 530, 391 A.2d 723 (1980). Seegenerally Comment, Constitutionality of Requiring Physicians and Other Health Care Providers to
Carry Malpractice Insurance, 7 W. ST. L. REv. 75 (1979).
45. The Catastrophe Loss Fund is funded by a 10% annual surcharge on the cost of a
health care provider's basic limits insurance.

46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.604 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). The maximum contingent fee on the first $100,000 is 30%; on the second $100,000, the maximum fee is 25%; and on
the remainder, the maximum fee is 20%.

III.

A.

The Structure and Performance of Arbitration
Under Act 11
A BriefAnalysis ofMedical MalpracticeArbitration Procedure

L Introduction.-Act 111 established Arbitration Panels for
Health Care,4 7 which had original and exclusive jurisdiction 4 8 to

hear and decide any malpractice claims against health care providers.49 A malpractice action is initiated by filing either a notice complaint, which is the equivalent of a summons in a court of common
pleas, or a complaint 50 in the Office of the Administrator of the arbi-

and pubtration panels.5 The Administrator is empowered to adopt
52
lish regulations to implement the provisions of the Act.
47. Id § 1301.308.
48. Id § 1301.309. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared the jurisdiction section of
Act Ill unconstitutional. Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980). Pennsylvania's arbitration panels now operate on a voluntary basis. See notes 197-201 and accompanying text inra.
Some Pennsylvania litigants have attempted to avoid the arbitration panels by bringing a
diversity action in federal court. The federal courts have uniformly dismissed the cases, holding that the federal court must do what a Pennsylvania state court would do in the same
situation. See, e.g., Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979); Zielinski v. Zappala, 470
F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Pa. 1979). See generally Turner, Medical MalpracticeArbitration on the
Erie Railroad, II U. TOL. L. REV. I (1979); Comment, MandatoryState MalpracticeArbitration Boards and The Erie Problem, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1562 (1980).
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.103 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). "Health care provider" is
defined as follows:
[A] primary health center or a person, corporation, facility, institution or other entity
licensed or approved by the Commonwealth to provide health care or professional
medical services as a physician, an osteopathic physician or surgeon, a podiatrist,
hospital, nursing home, and. . . an officer, employee or agent of any of them acting
in the course and scope of his employment.
Id The Arbitration Panels For Health Care were also given jurisdiction to hear and decide
any claim asserted against a nonhealth care provider who is made a party defendant with a
health care provider. Id § 1301.309. The term "nonhealth care provider" is intended only to
encompass those persons who, like manufacturers of drugs or medical instruments, are kindred
to health care providers. Gilette v. Redinger, 34 Pa. Commw. Ct. 469, 474, 383 A.2d 1292,
1298 (1978). Thus, the tortfeasor who caused the injury that led to negligent health care cannot be made a defendant with the health care provider. Id at 475, 383 A.2d at 1298. The
administration of Act I Il is funded in part from fees charged to each health care provider
practicing in the Commonwealth. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.304 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
50. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.503 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81); 37 PA. CODE § 171.23
(1981). The Administrator's office maintains a docket sheet for each case that is filed. After
the initial pleading is filed, defendants respond by filing an answer or a preliminary objection,
or by entering an appearance. Once the initial pleading is filed, the parties may engage in
discovery. See Memorandum and Findings of Fact at 6, Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385,
421 A.2d 190 (1980). The statute of limitations is tolled on the date the notice complaint or
complaint is mailed or delivered to the Administrator. 37 PA. CODE § 171.24.
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.301. The Office of the Administrator was part of the
Pennsylvania Department of Justice. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.301 (Purdon Supp. 198081). Since passage of the Commonwealth Attorney Act, 1980 Pa. Law 950, No. 164 §§ 101 to
506 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 732-101 to § 732-504 (Purdon Pamphlet 1981-82)),
the Office of Administrator is within the Office of General Counsel. The Administrator is
appointed by the Governor and can be removed for incompetence, neglect of duty, misconduct
in office, or other good cause. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.302 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
52. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.307 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). The regulations are
printed at 37 PA. CODE §§ 171.1-171.154 (1981).

2 Discovery.-Discovery under Act 111 is quite similar to discovery in other civil cases. The Act dictates that arbitration proceedings follow the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure and state
evidentiary law.5 3 The Administrator's Office is analogous to the
Prothonotary's Office in the courts of common pleas because all motions and pleadings are filed there.5 4 Parties to the action may take
depositions and obtain discovery within the same time limitations
imposed in a court of common pleas."5 The Administrator rules on

motions that arise during the discovery period and performs tasks
that would otherwise be carried out by a trial judge.5 6
3.

Conferences andArbitration.-Pennsylvania's

medical mal-

practice arbitration procedure differs from civil proceedings in its
emphasis on settlement. The parties are required to submit to a conciliation conference57 and a prehearing conference; 58 only a pretrial
conference is required in a civil proceeding.5 9 If the conciliation
conference fails to settle the claim, either party may file a certificate
of readiness for arbitration with the Administrator.6' The Administrator then selects an arbitration panel consisting of a health care
provider, an attorney, and a layperson. 6 The attorney chairs the
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.506 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). Most arbitration systems
mandate relaxed rules of civil procedure and evidence to promote the speedy resolution of
disputes. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 834 (Purdon 1952).
54. 37 PA. CODE § 171.21-171.27 (1981). See also Memorandum, supra note 50, at 4.
55. 37 PA. CODE § 171.31-171.35. Discovery is to be completed within thirty days of
filing of the certificate of readiness. Id § 171.33.
56. Id § 171.41. See note 218 and accompanying text infra.
57. Id § 171.61. The Administrator conducts the conciliation conference. Prior to each
conference a memorandum is prepared and includes statements of economic loss, medical
reports, hospital records, written reports of each party's expert witnesses, each party's statement of factual contentions and legal theory, a statement indicating whether a previous settlement conference was held and, if so, plaintiff's lowest demand and defendant's highest offer,
and the dollar amount for which the party would settle the case. Id § 171.62. Counsel may
exchange memoranda before the conference. Id § 171.61(c). These procedures give each
party a more realistic view of the case and aid the Administrator in encouraging settlement.
See also Memorandum, supra note 50, at 6-7.
58. 37 PA. CODE § 171.81. At the prehearing conference, the parties consider simplification of issues, the exchange of exhibits, obtaining admissions or stipulations, limitation of the
number of expert witnesses, scheduling the hearing, and such other matters as may aid the
expeditious disposition of the claim. The parties are to come to the conference "fully prepared
for a useful discussion of all problems involved in the proceeding, both procedural and substantive, and fully authorized to make commitments with respect thereto." Id § 171.81(b).
See also Memorandum, supra note 50, at 8.
59. The pretrial conference in civil cases is held to simplify issues, to limit the number of
expert witnesses, and to consider all matters that will speed the resolution of the claim. 9 PA.
BULL. 3936 (1979).
60. 37 PA. CODE § 171.81. The certificate of readiness must certify that the claim is ready
to proceed to a panel hearing, discovery will be completed within thirty days, the filing party
has an expert witness to support his claim, a conciliation conference has been held, and serious
settlement negotiations were not productive. As of February 12, 1980, all certificates of readiness must be filed within one year of the commencement of the case. Id § 171.123.
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.308(b) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). Act II1 originally
established seven-member panels consisting of two health care providers, two attorneys, and
three laypersons. The Administrator, however, experienced extreme difficulty in attempting to

panel and determines all questions of law and admissibility of evidence.6 2 The panel makes findings of fact, decides the question of
liability, and awards damages, 63 including punitive damages when

appropriate. 64

4. Review of the PanelDecision.-Enforcement

of the arbitra-

tion panel's award is accomplished by transferring the judgment to a
court of common pleas for execution. 65 Any party dissatisfied with
the panel's decision, however, may appeal to a court of common
pleas for a trial de novo.6 6 The panel's factual determinations and
its final decision are admissible at the new trial; but the damages
awarded, if any, are excluded from the jury's consideration. 67 This
schedule hearings around the busy schedules of four professionals. Consequently, the Act was
amended to reduce the number of panelists to three. See notes 68-85 and accompanying text
infra. The Administrator maintains a pool of arbitration panel candidates and selects a list of
panelists for presentation to the parties to an action. 37 PA. CODE § 171.73. Each party is
entitled to a peremptory challenge against one member of the panel selected by the Administrator. Id § 171.73(c). Each party may challenge for cause any panel members selected by the
Administrator. Id § 171.73(b). The parties may select panelists by stipulation. Id § 171.72.
Any person invited to serve as an arbitration panel member may decline to serve or must
disclose to the Administrator under oath any circumstances that might affect his impartiality.
Id § 171.76.
62. After a panel chairperson is appointed, he or she assumes the duty of the Administrator and determines all questions involving preheating procedures, discovery, and motions. 37
PA. CODE § 171.41(a). The chairperson presides over the prehearing conference. Id
§ 171.81(a). In addition, the chairperson is authorized to limit the number of witnesses whose
testimony is similar, the number of attorneys representing the same party or group of parties,
the number of attorneys who may actively participate in the trial of the case or who may
examine or cross-examine witnesses, and the number and length of addresses to the arbitration
panel. Id § 171.98.
63. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.508 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81), authorizes the arbitration
panel to do the following:
(1) examine the relevant facts to determine if a case exists for recovery; (2) make
findings of fact; (3) take depositions and testimony; (4) assure both parties full access
to the facts; (5) make available to the parties the norms, standards and criteria employed by health care providers in the Professional Standards Review Organization
region; (6) subpoena witnesses, and administer oaths; (7) apply to the court of common pleas to enforce the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production
and examination of books, papers and records; (8) consider and approve offers of
settlement involving fiduciaries, minors and incompetent parties; (9) make determinations as to liability and award of damages; and (10) exercise all other powers and
duties conferred to it by law.
The arbitration panel may, upon the application of either party or upon its own order, appoint
an impartial expert to examine the claimant or relevant evidentiary matter and to have him
testify to his findings. Id § 1301.507. Except for questions of law, which are determined by
the panel chairperson, a majority vote of the full arbitration panel is required to decide all
matters before it. Id § 1301.505.
64. Id § 1301.603. Punitive damages may be awarded upon a finding that the injury or
damage to the patient was caused, in whole or in part, by willful or wanton misconduct by any
of the defendants.
65. Id § 1301.511.
66. Id § 1301.509. See also Memorandum, supra note 50, at 8; Comment, Compulsory
Arbitration in Pennsylvania: Effect ofan Appeal by One o/Several Parties, 48 PA. B.A.Q. 557
(1977); Note, Arbitration-CompulsoryArbitration in Pennsylvania-ArbitrationAct-De Novo
Appeals, 16 DUQ. L. REv. 443 (1977-78).
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.510 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). The provision allowing
the arbitration panel's findings of fact and liability to be admitted at trial has been subjected to
constitutional attack on the ground that it denies the parties their right to a trial by jury. The

provision was added to dissuade appeals in less than meritorious
cases.
B.

The Performance of the ArbitrationSystem

The arbitration system has proved to be anything but "equitable, judicious and less expensive and time consuming than the present court system."68 Processing of claims has been cumbersome,
resulting in an extensive backlog of cases. One Pennsylvania
Supreme Court Justice remarked,
The Medical Malpractice Act of 1976 is an unworkable mess....
It is a piece of social legislation which has not achieved a single
one of its purposes ....
bounds each year ....

[The] backlog is growing by leaps and
The only thing this Act has successfully

done is create a bureaucracy which impedes the resolution of disputes by its citizens.69

In his annual reports to the Governor, 0 the Administrator
warned that legislative change was required to expedite the processing of claims and to avoid constitutional challenges to the Act.7 1 Because the number of claims filed in 1978 doubled the number filed in
1976 and 1977 combined, serious problems arose.72 The Administrator experienced extreme difficulty in convening the seven member
panels that were originally called for under the Act.7" Arranging
hearing dates to accommodate the schedules of four busy professionals and three laypersons for occasionally lengthy periods was an impossible task. 74 The Administrator also identified the formal
attack is based upon the presumption that the jury will be so influenced by the decision of the

arbitration panel that it will not consider the facts and issues fairly. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has rejected this argument and upheld the constitutionality of the provision.
See notes 167-176 and accompanying text infra. Maryland takes this provision one step further
by providing that the panel decision is presumptively correct. MD. CTS. & JUD. PIOC. CODE
ANN. § 3-2A-06(d) (Supp. 1980). See Comment, The Constitutionality of Medical Malpractice
Mediation Panels: .4 Maryland Perspective, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 75, 92-97 (1979).
68. As of December 15, 1980, 3,970 claims were ified with the Arbitration Panels for
Health Care. Only 1,247 of those claims had been terminated.
(1) Claims in which arbitration panel hearings were held .................
58
(2) Claims dismissed (no jurisdiction, nonpayment of fees, etc.) ...........
37
(3) Claims transferred to courts of common pleas (no jurisdiction) .........
87
(4) Claims discontinued with no monetary settlement ..................
231
(5) Claims discontinued where monetary settlement was disclosed .........
704
(6) Claims discontinued where monetary settlement was not disclosed ......
15
(7) Claims ended by judgment of non pros .............................
115
ARBITRATION PANELS FOR HEALTH CARE-STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 1976-1980, Harrisburg,
PA (1980).
69. Parker v. Children's Hosp. of Phil., 483 Pa. 106, 132, 394 A.2d 932, 945 (1978) (Larsen, J., dissenting).
70. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.306 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
71. See Joint Reproduced Record at 637a, Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d
190 (1980).
72. Id at 609a. Forty-eight claims were flied in 1976, 422 in 1977, and 969 in the first ten
months of 1978.
73. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
74. "As the 'pipeline fills up' and the number of claims ready for arbitration hearings
builds, we can see no possibility of responding promptly to requests for hearings, if we must

discovery and evidentiary provisions of the Act as a contributing factor to the delay. 75 In 1978, the Administrator cautioned the Governor that "unless a substantial number of claims resulted in
prearbitration settlement, those claims requiring the convening of an
arbitration panel will increase to such proportions that it will not be
possible for this office to provide the prompt hearings contemplated
76
by the Act."
In December of 1979, the Pennsylvania Legislature made several significant adjustments to Act 11. Arbitration panels were reduced in size from seven members to three, consisting of one health
78
77
care provider, one attorney, and one layman. The prior method
of selecting panel members was replaced with a system of Administrator appointments.7 9 Parties' peremptory challenges to panelists
were reduced from six to one.8" Finally, the legislature permitted the
transfer of a claim to a court of common pleas if a panel was not
selected within ninety days of filing the certificate of readiness. 8 1
follow the current procedure of selecting seven arbitrators." Record, supra note 71, at 615a. It
is likely that it will be difficult to procure even one physician to sit on the arbitration panels.
Arbitration hearings can be prolonged and physicians are reluctant to leave their practices for
any extended period of time.
75. See Record, supra note 71, at 611 a-612a, 633a-634a. Specifically, the Administrator
recommended that § 307 of the Act be amended to permit the Administrator of the panels to
adopt rules that are not consistent with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, and that
§ 506 be amended to authorize the Administrator to adopt special rules of evidence and practice. Both of these requests were reasonable and prudent, particularly in light of the constitutional attacks to which the Act was subjected at the time. The General Assembly should have
complied with these requests to streamline the hearing process.
76. Record, supra note 71, at 610a. Proponents of Act Ill stress that of 3,970 claims
filed, 1,189 cases have been settled, discontinued, or ended without resort to a hearing. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 68. There is no reason to believe, however, that the Act is
responsible for these settlements because, typically, only 11.5% of all malpractice claims ever
reach trial. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 11, at 10.
77. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.308(b) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
78. Act 111 originally required the Administrator to select seven panel members via the
strike list method, whereby arbitration members were selected from a pool of candidates generated by the Administrator's office. After a certificate of readiness was filed, the administrator
sent each party an identical list of five arbitration panel candidates in each of the three categories of health care provider, attorney, and layperson. The list was accompanied by a brief
biographical statement on each candidate and each party was permitted to strike from the list
any two names in each category that were unacceptable. Any mutually acceptable candidate
was invited by the Administrator to serve on a panel. If an insufficient number of mutually
acceptable candidates remained for any category, a second list of candidates in that category
was sent to the parties. If a complete arbitration panel was not selected by mutual agreement
of the parties after the second round, the Administrator was empowered to appoint the remainder of the arbitration panel. After a panel renders its decision, it is disbanded. See Abrams,
MedicalMalpracticeLitigatiom The Arbitration Approach, 47 PA. B.A.Q. 495, 496 (1976). See
also Record, supra note 71, at 275a-279a.
79. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.308(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81); 37 PA. CODE § 171.72171.76. The Administrator recommended to the legislature that it permit tenured panel members and thereby created the ability to hire certain panel members on a regular basis instead of
on a "per chance and per time basis." Record, supra note 71, at 443a. This system of panel
selection would expedite the panel selection process because the Administrator could recommend the selection of only those panel members who had proven to be reliable, cooperative,
and competent.
80. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.308(c) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
81. Id § 1301.403.

Unfortunately, the legislature's amendments did not resolve the
backlog. As of December 15, 1980, 69 percent of the cases filed with
the Administrator remained unresolved.82 Even worse, 11 percent of
the cases filed in 1976 remained unresolved despite the passage of
four years.83 Of the 3,970 cases filed over the four year period, only
fifty-eight resulted in the convening of an arbitration panel.84
The failure of the arbitration system to process claims expeditiously proved fatal to Act 111. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
found that "such delays are unconscionable and irreparably rip the
fabric of public confidence in the efficiency and effectiveness of our
judicial system."85
IV.

Act Ill and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Most state medical malpractice mediation statutes have been
subjected to attacks under both federal and state constitutions.8 6 Although not every state court decision has discussed the full range of
constitutional issues, five basic constitutional challenges have been
raised: (1) violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) violation of the
separation of powers provision or the judicial powers provision of
the state constitution; (3) denial of procedural due process under the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution; (4) violation of the right to free access to courts under a provision of the state
constitution; and (5) violation of the right to trial by jury as guaranteed by a state constitutional provision.87 The Pennsylvania
82. See note 68 supra.
83. As of December 15, 1980, 11% of the claims filed in 1976, 27% of those filed in 1977,
55% of those filed in 1978, 77% of those filed in 1979 and 94% of the claims filed in 1980
remained unresolved. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 68.
84. Id The statistic on the number of arbitration panels convened from 1976 to 1980 is
misleading without consideration of the statistic on the number of certificates of readiness filed
with the Administrator, since the Administrator normally does not attempt to convene a hearing until he receives a certificate of readiness from the parties. See notes 182-187 and accompanying text in>fa.
85. Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 396, 421 A.2d 190, 195 (1980).
86. The majority of jurisdictions have upheld the constitutionality of medical malpractice mediation panels. See, e.g., DiAntonio-Accomack Memorial Hosp., 628 F.2d 287 (4th Cir.
1980); Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1979); Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp.,
465 F. Supp. 421 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977);
Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978); Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385
A.2d 57 (1978); Paro v. Longwood Hosp., - Mass. -,369 N.E.2d 985 (1977); Prendergast v.
Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 App. Div. 2d 304, 390
N.Y.S.2d 122 (1977); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434
(1978). Five mediation panel statutes, other than Pennsylvania's, have been found unconstitutional. See note 9 supra
87. See Lockaby, Constitutional Challenges to Medical Malpractice Review Boards, 46
TENN. L. REV. 607 (1979). See generally M. REDISH, LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CISIS: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 4-7 (1977); Lenore, Mandatory
MedicalMalpracticeMediationPanels-A ConstitutionalExamination, 44 INS. COUNSEL J. 416
(1977); Comment, ConstitutionalConsiderationsof Medical MalpracticeScreening Panels, 27
AM. U. L. REV. 161 (1977).

Supreme Court ruled on all five basic constitutional challenges.
Only three years after Act 111 was enacted, in Parker v. Children's
Hospital,8 8 the court upheld the constitutionality of the Act with the

caveat that "[ilt is an accepted principle of constitutional law that
deference to a coequal branch of government requires that we accord

a reasonable period of time to test the effectiveness of legislation. "89
The supreme court's caveat invited a second constitutional challenge to the Act. Less than a year after Parker, the court assumed
plenary jurisdiction over Mattos v. Thompson.9 0 In Mattos, the court

was satisfied that sufficient time had passed for meaningful evaluation of the arbitration system and declared unconstitutional section
309 of the Act, which gave the arbitration panels original and exclusive jurisdiction over medical malpractice claims. 9'
In considering how to amend Act Ill to effectively combat the

problems inherent in malpractice litigation, a thorough analysis of
the constitutionality of the Act is necessary. Although the holding in
Parker was overruled in Matos, the Parker decision is worthy of
discussion because the court devoted a major portion of its Mattos
decision to a discussion of Parker, and because only one of the nu-

merous issues raised by the litigants in Parker was subsequently reversed in Mattos In analyzing the various constitutional challenges
raised in Parker and Mallos, it should be remembered that in Penn-

sylvania "a legislative enactment enjoys a presumption in favor of its
constitutionality and will not be declared unconstitutional unless it
clearly,palpably andplainly violates the constitution. All doubts are
to be resolved in favor of a finding of constitutionality." 92
88. 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978).
89. Id at 121, 394 A.2d at 940. The supreme court reserved the right to find the Act
unconstitutional at a later date when it clarified its position as follows:
In reaching our conclusion today we are relying upon the legislative judgment that
the procedures provided for under the Act will substantially expedite the disposition
of malpractice cases in this jurisdiction. We are aware of many instances where arbitration has been used in other areas of dispute-resolution where it has produced significant results in expediting the disposition of those matters. The stated purpose of
the Act expressly provides as an objective that one who sustains injury or death as a
result of the fault of a health care provider 'can obtain a prompt determination and
adjudicationof his claim and the determination offair and reasonablecompensation.'
See § 102. In conferring upon the administrator the power to promulgate rules and
regulations the General Assembly charged that the power was given to effectuate the
purposes of the Act. Appellants have cited statistics which would indicate that the
present performance of this procedure has been far from impressive in demonstrating
its capacity to provide an expeditious disposition of these cases. Nevertheless the
period of time covered by the accumulated data is insufficient to establish either that
the legislative scheme is incapable of achieving its stated purposes or that the administrator is unable or unwilling to provide the administration that will insure the
prompt and fair resolution promised.
Id
90. 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980).
91. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.309 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
92. Parker v. Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. at 116, 394 A.2d at 937. See Singer v. Sheppard,
464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897 (1975); Glancey v. Casey, 447 Pa. 77, 288 A.22 812 (1972); Milk

.4. Equal Protection

Mediation panel statutes typically require only medical malpractice claimants to submit their claims to pretrial review. Act 111,

for example, provides for compulsory arbitration of malpractice
cases in which the plaintiff brings a medical negligence claim against
a health care provider.9 3 The distinction between malpractice defendants and other defendants raises the question of whether such a

classification violates the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution.
Traditionally, equal protection challenges have been subjected

to a two-tier analysis--the strict scrutiny test and the rational basis
test.94 Strict scrutiny is exercised when a statute creates a classification affecting a suspect class9 5 or infringing upon a fundamental
right.9 6 For a statute to be valid under the strict scrutiny test, the

state must demonstrate that the statute was enacted to satisfy a compelling state interest and that no less restrictive alternative exists.9 7

When the strict scrutiny standard of review is applied by a court, it
usually proves to be "strict in theory and fatal in fact," resulting in
the invalidation of the statute.98 No court, however, has applied the

strict scrutiny test to mediation panel legislation99 because those statutes neither affect a suspect class, nor infringe upon a fundamental
right. 1oo
Control Comm'n v. Battista, 413 Pa. 652, 198 A.2d 840 (1964); Daly v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 263,
191 A.2d 835 (1963).
93. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.309. See note 49 supra for the definition of the term
"health care provider" and a discussion ofjoinder of additional defendants under Act 111.
94. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword- In Search ofEvolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer EqualProtection, 86 HARY. L. REV. 1 (1972). See
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUlrTIoNAL LAW 1012 (1978).
95. Suspect classifications involve "immutable personal characteristics or historical patterns of discrimination and political powerlessness." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973). See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1967) (classification
based on race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948) (classification based on na-

tional origin).
96. Fundamental rights include such rights as are "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of privacy); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969) (right of interstate travel); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right of procreation). See generally Cord, Neo-Incorporation: The Burger Court and the Due Process
Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, 44 Fo I-AM L. REV. 215 (1975).
97. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
98. Gunther, he Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model/for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
Statutes that affect a suspect class or infringe upon a fundamental right are almost invariably
found to lack a compelling state interest.
99. See, e.g., Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977); Attorney General
v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978); Paro v. Longwood Hosp., - Mass. -, 369 N.E.2d
985 (1977); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55
App. Div. 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1976).
100. See Comment, supra note 67, at 84-89; Lockaby, supra note 87, at 614-27. Arguably,
strict scrutiny should be applied in these cases because mediation panel legislation infringes
upon the rights of trial by jury and free access to the courts. That these rights are found in
state constitutions rather than in the federal constitution should not affect whether the right is
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The majority of jurisdictions apply the minimum rationality test
enunciated in McGowan v. Maryland'0 to malpractice mediation
statutes. A statute is valid under the rational basis test if a reasonable relationship exists between the classification created and the objective of the statute.' 0 2 Courts will not set aside a legislative
classification "if any state of facts may reasonably be conceived to
justify it.' 0 3 In Parker, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed
the majority rule and exercised the rational basis test. In upholding
the constitutionality of Act 111, the court stated,
Where the reason for the postponement of the right results from
the effort on the part of the state to achieve a compelling state
interest and the procedure is reasonably designed to effectuate the
designed objective, it cannot be said that there has been1 a4 constitutionally impermissible encroachment upon that right. '
The supreme court correctly recognized that the existence of the

medical malpractice crisis, or at least the General Assembly's perception of a crisis, provides the requisite rational basis for Act I l's
distinction between malpractice defendants and other defendants.
The ultimate goal of the arbitration panels is to ameliorate the mal-

practice insurance crisis. Because the classification of malpractice
claims in a separate category from other tort claims is reasonably
related to this legislative goal, the arbitration provisions of Act 111

withstands the rational basis test.105
B.

Separation of Powers

The doctrine of separation of powers concerns the division of
authority within state government among the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches. Each branch is independent of the others and

each performs duties that are not subject to the control of the others.
deemed fundamental. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374-77 (1971) (access to the
courts in divorce cases is fundamental); Redish, Legislative Response to the MedicalMalpractice
Crisis: ConstitutionalImplications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759, 779 (1977). But see United States v.

Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (clarifying Boddie as based upon the marital relationship, not the
right of access to the courts); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (Boddie did not invalidate a filing fee requirement for review of an administrative denial of welfare benefits).
101. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
102. The constitutional safeguard [of equal protection) is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective.
State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.
366 U.S. at 425-26 (emphasis added).
103. Id Statutes subjected to the rational basis test are almost invariably sustained. See
generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term---Foreword" In Search ofEvolving Doctrne
on a Changing Court." 4 Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. I (1972).

104. 483 Pa. at 120, 394 A.2d at 939 (emphasis added).
105. If the supreme court had found that the arbitration provisions mandated in Act 111
were not rationally related to the goal of providing an alternative to expensive litigation, its
finding could not have been reconciled with Smith Case, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625 (1955), in
which the court upheld the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania compulsory civil arbitration
statute.

No branch may exercise the powers properly vested in the other de-

partments.' °6 The vast majority of states place their mediation
panels under the judicial branch of government where they are ad-

ministered by a judicial officer or clerk of courts, and thus no separation of powers problem exists. 0 7 In Pennsylvania, however, the
Administrator's office is a unit of the office of General Counsel
within the executive branch,10 8 thereby subjecting Act 111 to challenge on the basis that judicial power has been improperly delegated
to a coordinate branch of government.
Thus, the important question is whether the power exercised by
the mediation panels is judicial.'0 9 If so, the mediation provisions

violate state constitutional provisions vesting judicial power exclusively in the courts. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed
this issue in Parker.i1o Specifically, appellants in Parker alleged that
the power conferred to the Administrator to promulgate regulations
necessary to fulfill the provisions of the Act violated article V, section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which vests in the courts
the exclusive power to prescribe rules of practice and procedure for

the courts." 1I In support of their claim, appellants delineated specific

instances in which the procedures for arbitration proceedings were at
variance with the rules of court. 1 12 Appellants further contended
that the power of the Administrator to rule upon motions prior to the

appointment of a panel chairman was an improper delegation of a
judicial function. 1 3 The Parker court rejected all of appellants' arguments and ruled that the authority delegated to the Administrator

does not constitute a judicial function."I4
The court's holding on this issue is well-reasoned. An administrative agency is defined under Pennsylvania law as
106. See Sweeney v. Tucker, 473 Pa. 493 (1977).
107. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a(1) (McKinney Supp. 1979). But see, e.g., MD. CTS.
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-03(a) (Supp. 1980).
108. See note 51 supra
109. See Lockaby, supra note 87, at 629-32; Comment, supra note 67, at 80-84.
110. 483 Pa. at 125-31, 394 A.2d at 942-45.
111. The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules governing
practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts, justices of the peace and all officers
serving process or enforcing orders, judgments or decrees of any court or justice of
the peace, including the power to provide for assignment and reassignment of classes
of actions or classes of appeals among the several courts as the needs of justice shall
require, and for admission to the bar and to practice law, and the administration of
all courts and supervision of all officers of the judicial branch, if such rules are consistent with this Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive
rights of any litigant, nor affect the right of the General Assembly to determine the
jurisdiction of any court or justice of the peace, nor suspend nor alter any statute of
limitation or repose. All laws shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent with rules prescribed under these provisions.
PA. CONsT. art. 5, § 10(c).
112. See Brief of Appellants Parker, Garcia and Bost, Jr. at 19-21, Parker v. Children's
Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978).
113. PA. CONST. art. 5, §§ 1, 12, 13.
114. 483 Pa. at 131, 394 A.2d at 942.

[a]ny department, departmental administrative board or commis-

sion, independent administrative board or commission, officer or
other agency of this Commonwealth, now in existence or hereafter
created, having statewide jurisdiction, empowered to determine or
affect private rights, privileges, immunities or obligations by regulations or adjudication, but shall not include a court of record nor
a magistrate, alderman or justice of the peace." 5
Because the office of the Administrator for Arbitration Panels for
Health Care is within the office of General Counsel, it constitutes an
agency of the Commonwealth. The office has statewide jurisdiction,
and both the arbitration panels and the Administrator are empowered to determine and affect the private rights and obligations of parties before them by regulation or adjudication. Act 111 neither
designates the panel as a court nor refers to the Administrator as a
judge, justice, magistrate, alderman, or justice of the peace. Accordingly, both the panel and the Administrator should be viewed as part
of the administrative, rather than the judicial branch of government.
Assuming that the Arbitration Panels for Health Care constitute
an administrative agency, the issue becomes whether the legislature
may provide an alternative administrative remedy for the resolution
of a malpractice claim. Appellants asserted that if a traditional common law remedy exists, it may not be replaced by an administrative
remedy. The Parker court correctly rejected that argument. Act Ill
did not remove a traditional judicial remedy, but rather added a new
administrative remedy. It has long been recognized that the exercise
of adjudicative functions by administrative agencies or administrators is not a withdrawal of the judicial function from the courts in
contravention of the doctrine of separation of powers." 6 Because
the legislature provided for a trial de novo following an arbitration
panel decision, Act 111 neither infringes upon nor sets aside the judicial power defined in article V." 7 Moreover, appellants' argument
115. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1701.2(b) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
116. In Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) the United States Supreme Court held that
the grant of power to adjudicate private rights to an administrative agency under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act was constitutionally permissible because
the Act provided for judicial review of the agency's determinations. The Court stated that
there is no requirement that "in order to maintain the essential attributes of judicial power all
determinations of fact in constitutional courts shall be made by judges." Id at 51. The reservation of final determination of legal questions to the reviewing court, notwithstanding an
adjudication by the agency, preserved the powers constitutionally vested in the judiciary. Id
at 54. The Supreme Court has since accepted that administrative agencies may, and necessarily must, make initial decisions on judicial questions of law incidental to their determinations.
Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540 (1946); Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S.
489 (1943). See Brief of Amicus Pennsylvania Medical Society at 30-37, Parker v. Children's
Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978).
117. Pennsylvania case law holds that the functions exercised by nonjudges in the context
of compulsory arbitration are not improper delegations of judicial power under the Pennsylvania Constitution. In Talhelm v. Buggy, 68 Dauph. 310, 9 D. & C.2d 482 (1955), the
Arbitration Act of 1952, which provided for the compulsory arbitration of claims under $1000
before a panel of attorneys, was upheld under a separation of powers challenge. The court
stated that "It]he arbitrators under this act fulfill the same functions that they do under the

to completely extinguish a
fails to consider the legislature's power
8
cause of action or create a new one."
Parker clearly illustrates the court's willingness to accede to innovative remedies devised by the legislature and its desire to prevent
"the stagnation of the law in the face of changing societal conditions." 19 In considering future amendments to Act 111, it should be
recognized that any requirement that a claimant first seek redress
through a statutorily created administrative remedy is not a usurpation of the powers vested in the courts under article V as long as the
statute permits an appeal to the courts de novo. Furthermore, the
powers vested in the Administrator do not represent an improper
delegation of judicial functions to a non-judicial officer.
C ProceduralDue Process
Appellants in both Parker and Mattos presented four grounds
for their assertion that Act 111 deprived them of procedural due process: (1)the physician members of the panel have a constitutionally
impermissible interest in the outcome of the proceedings; (2) the Administrator has totally unfettered discretion to choose individual
panel members and to choose the attorney who will serve as
chairperson; (3) the physician members of the panel will use their
own professional experience rather than sworn testimony in deciding
the case; and (4) the chairperson of the panel, after instructing the
other panel members on the law, retires to deliberate with the other
panel members.' 2 0 The supreme court rejected all four contentions
and refused to find any violation of appellants' rights to due process
of law. 121
basic Arbitration Act of 1936. They were not judges in 1936 and are not judges now. This
contention is utterly lacking in merit." Id at 314, 9 D. & C.2d at 486-87. Similarly, County of
Wash. v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 315, 364 A.2d 519 (1976),
held that the exercise of judicial functions by the Labor Relations Board was constitutionally
permissible since the independence of the judiciary and its ultimate authority were adequately
preserved by the right to judicial review. Id at 337, 364 A.2d at 529.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin dismissed a claim similar to appellants', holding that
"there is no usurpation ofjudicial authority here because not only are the petitioners afforded
a judicial review of the determination of the panel, they are entitled to a trial de novo in a
court." State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 505, 261 N.W.2d 434, 448 (1978).
Accord, Paro v. Longwood Hosp., - Mass. -, 369 N.E.2d 985 (1977); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116
Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977).
118. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.301 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81) (abolished tort
liability for injuries arising from the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle). See also Singer v.
Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897 (1975); Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 263 Pa. 158, 106 A.
238 (1919), afl'd, 260 U.S. 22 (1922).
119. 483 Pa. at 127, 394 A.2d at 943. See Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897
(1975); Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 263 Pa. 158, 106 A. 238 (1919). See also Munn v. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113.(1876).
120. See. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 52-67, Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421
A.2d 190 (1980); Brief of Appellants Parker, Garcia and Bost, Jr. at 25-51, Parker v. Children's
Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978).
121. Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 386, 421 A.2d 190, 191-92; Parker v. Children's
Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 128-31, 394 A.2d 932, 939-44.

1. Physician Panel Members' Interest in the Outcome of the
Hearing.-Appellants argued that because lower awards to plaintiffs
may reduce malpractice insurance premiums, the physician members
of the arbitration panels may have a financial interest in the outcome
of the proceedings. A second alleged financial interest was that physician panel members had an incentive to keep awards below one
hundred thousand dollars because a depletion of the Catastrophe
Loss Fund,1 22 which is funded by a surcharge on physicians' insurance premiums, would increase the total annual physician surcharge.
Appellants contended that the existence of these financial interests
rendered the inclusion of health care providers on the arbitration
panel violative of the impartiality principle enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in Gibson v. Berryhill 123 In Gibson, the Court
held that the right to procedural due process was infringed by a decision of the Alabama State Board of Optometry revoking the licenses
of nearly half of all practicing optometrists in the state. Specifically,
the licenses of those optometrists employed by corporations were revoked. The Board of Optometry was composed solely of optometrists in private practice, all of whom benefited directly and
substantially from the revocations.
The Parkercourt distinguished appellants' contentions from the
Gibson holding on several grounds. The medical malpractice arbitration panels established by Act 111 are composed of a minority of
health care providers as opposed to the majority of partial board
members in Gibson. Furthermore, appellants failed to introduce specific facts, other than the mere assertion that the health care provider
automatically taints the arbitration process, to show that the health
care provider members of the panel are directly and substantially
interested in the outcome of the arbitration process. Also, the rules
of procedure applied by the panels are not, as in Gibson, decreed
exclusively by persons with a pecuniary interest in the health care
industry, but are determined by the courts. Finally, the court
stressed that the Pennsylvania Legislature did not delegate a general
legislative authority to fix governmental policy as was done in Gibson. Instead, arbitration panels merely apply the law of the Commonwealth to the facts of a particular case.' 24
122. See notes 36-45 and accompanying text supra.
123. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
124. 483 Pa. at 129-30, 394 A.2d at 944. The Mattos court upheld the Parker decision
despite the adamant dissent of Justice Larsen.
The inclusion of two health care providers (doctors, hospitals, etc.) on the seven
member panel denies a plaintiff a constitutionally provided fair trial. The health care
providers' contributions to the 'fund' are determined by the size of awards granted to
laintiffs. It is like the fox deciding if the chicken should be reimbursed for the fox
aving raided the chicken coop.
Id. Recent statistics released by panel administrators in a number of states cast some
doubt upon the soundness of the supreme court's holding. These statistics indicate that nearly

Because any financial interest inherent in the structure of Act
111 remains speculative, the supreme court correctly presumed phy-

sicians to be persons of honesty and integrity. 125 The steps that Act
111 takes to insure impartiality safeguard the rights of litigants to

due process. The Act provides for unlimited challenges for cause of
any panel member, whether selected by mutual agreement or by the
Administrator.126 In addition, it provides for one peremptory challenge 127 and mandates that "no member shall participate in a case in

which he may have an interest."'' 2 The regulations permit the parties to challenge the qualifications of any candidate to serve as an
impartial arbitrator.' 29 Furthermore, the questionnaires sent to all
arbitrator candidates are designed to elicit the kind of information
that would reflect bias.' 3 ° Finally, the oath of office, to which each

panel member must swear, requires the disclosure of any circumstance that might affect impartiality.' 3 '
In light of the procedural safeguards afforded by Act 111, and in
the absence of specific evidence to the contrary, arbitrators must be

presumed to be impartial. More importantly, however, without a
presumption of impartiality, the central purpose of the entire statutory scheme would be frustrated. Arbitration panels are required to
decide highly technical medical issues. The legislature perceived the
75% of all arbitration hearings are won by defendant health care providers. Proponents of
medical mediation panels assert, however, that reliance solely on the outcome of arbitration
hearings obfuscates the larger importance of screening panels. These proponents point out
that, despite the overwhelming number of decisions in favor of health care providers, few
states are witnessing a large percentage of appeals from panel decisions. Furthermore, the
high correlation between the panels' decisions and the final dispositions of cases may indicate
that screening panels are effectively screening less than meritorious claims. At the same time,
however, it may be argued that meritorious claims are abandoned because of burdens that are
placed upon parties who appeal the decision of the panel, such as the admission of the panel
decision at trial, or the requirement of the posting of a bond. Id at 133, 394 A.2d at 946
(Larsen, J., dissenting). See P. Carlin, supra note 22.
125. 483 Pa. at 130, 394 A.2d at 944. Accord, Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975);
State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 503, 261 N.W.2d 434, 446 (1978). Appellees
in Parker presented the following interesting argument:
[11f Appellants' claim of financial interest in the outcome is carried to its logical conclusion the entire panel would be unqualified to serve. First, defense attorneys may
be interested in keeping awards low. For similar reasons, plaintiffs' attorneys may be
motivated to keep the awards high. And because increases in the cost of malpractice
insurance are directly passed on to the consumer by way of increases in the cost of
health care, the lay members of the panel-patients all--may be motivated to keep
awards low. Thus, pursuing Appellants' reasoning to its conclusion, no members of
the panel, as constituted, and few members of any jury would be sufficiently impartial to fairly decide the issues in a malpractice case.
Brief of Amicus Pennsylvania Medical Society at 39.
126. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.308(c) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
127. Id
128. Id § 1301.308(g).
129. 37 PA. CODE § 171.76(c).
130. Joint Reproduced Record at 275a-278a, Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d
190 (1980).
131. Abrahms, Pennsylvania r New Medical MalpracticeArbitration Procedure, The Legal
Intelligencer, January 19, 1977. See Brief of Amicus Pennsylvania Medical Society, Parker v.
Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978).

technicality of medical negligence cases as a contributing factor to
exorbitant jury awards, which in turn fueled the medical malpractice
insurance crisis.' 32 To preserve the function of the arbitration panels
as envisioned by the General Assembly, the special expertise of medically trained panel members is essential, and should be disrupted
133
only upon substantial and concrete evidence of financial interest.
2. Administrator'sDiscretion in Choosing PanelMembers.-In

Parker,the supreme court ruled that the essential elements of procedural due process--"notice and opportunity to be heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case
before a tribunal having jurisdiction of the cause"-' 34 were not violated by the provisions of Act 111, which allow the Administrator to
exercise discretion in appointing panel members and the panel
chairperson. 135 Contrary to appellants' arguments, the Administrator's discretion in the selection of panel members is not "unfettered."' 136 In some cases it will be the parties themselves who select
the panel members, and in cases in which the parties fail to agree,
panel members selected by the Administrator are subject to challenge for cause. 137 Moreover, the arbitration panel is not a jury and,
138
therefore, not subject to the strictures applicable to jury selection.
Since appellants presented no evidence of abuse of discretion on the
part of the Administrator, and since arbitration proceedings are reviewable in a trial de novo, the court concluded that there is no denial of due process.
3. Physician Panel Member's Consideration of Extrinsic Evi-

dence.-The Parker court rejected appellants' assertion that health
care providers will ignore the law and the facts in arriving at their
determination because "[albsent evidence to the contrary, panel
139
members are presumed to be persons of honesty and integrity."'
The court was further persuaded by the fact that health care providers cannot control the outcome of a panel decision since they are a
minority. More importantly, however, appellants failed to consider
that the panel is not a judge or a jury, but rather a "quasi-judicial
administrative board with fact-finding powers. ' ' 4°
132. See notes 16-18 and accompanying text supra
133. See State ex rel Stryokowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 503, 261 N.W.2d 434, 445-46
(1978).
134. Conestoga Nat'l Bank v. Patterson, 442 Pa. 289, 295, 275 A.2d 6, 9 (1971).
135. 483 Pa. at 130-31, 394 A.2d at 944-45.
136. Brief of Appellants Parker, Garcia and Bost, Jr. at 39-43.
137. 37 PA. CODE § 171.71-171.77.
138. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
139. 483 Pa. at 130, 394 A.2d at 944. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); State ex
rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 503, 261 N.W.2d 434, 446 (1978).
140. 483 Pa. at 130, 394 A.2d at 944.

Although the holding of the court on this issue is sound, the
court's rationale is incomplete. The court failed to note that the rules
promulgated by the Administrator pursuant to Act 111 adequately
safeguard against the danger of panel members considering extrinsic
evidence.' 4 ' Furthermore, it is widely accepted that every jury member and every finder of fact necessarily brings to bear on his decision
the benefit of experience and common sense. This principle is inherent in the jury system and in no way contravenes it.' 42 Indeed, the
very reason the legislature placed physicians143on the arbitration panel
was to take advantage of their experience.
4. Deliberationsof the Panel -The supreme court summarily
rejected appellants' assertion that the chairperson's deliberation with
the panel, after instructing them on applicable law, infringed appellants' right to procedural due process. 144 The court could not have
found otherwise in light of long accepted practice in Pennsylvania
compulsory civil arbitration proceedings. In these proceedings, three
attorney panel members render their decision out of the presence of
counsel with no restriction upon the nature of the communications
between them. 45 The procedural rules established by the Administrator provide greater protection for the due process rights of the
parties by requiring that counsel to each party be notified if, during
the course of deliberations, a need for additional points of charge or
correction of prior points of charge exists, and by requiring that
counsel be present and46 given the opportunity to be heard during a
supplemental charge. 1
D. Free Access to the Courts
Screening panel legislation has been challenged on the ground
that it denies free access to the courts in violation of a state constitutional provision. " The fundamental argument is that the screening
panel requirement imposes a financial burden upon the plaintiff by
141. "Arbitration panel members shall not consider or bring into the deliberations any
matters not admitted into evidence, but may consider those facts of which a court could properly take judicial notice and the chairperson shall so charge the panel." 37 PA. CODE
§ 171.104(a) (1981).
142. See Brief of Amicus Pennsylvania Medical Society at 45-47, Parker v. Children's
Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978).
143. See notes 236-37 and accompanying text Infra
144. 483 Pa. at 131, 394 A.2d at 945.
145. See Conestoga Nat'l Bank v. Patterson, 442 Pa. 289, 295, 275 A.2d 6, 9 (1971).
146. 37 PA. CODE § 171.106(c) (1981).
147. See, e.g., Paro v. Longwood Hosp., - Mass. -, 369 N.E.2d 985 (1977) (requirement

that appellant must post a $2000 bond as a condition to pursuing his claim is not a violation of
the due process principle of free access to the courts). But see, e.g., Eastin v. Broomfield, 116
Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977) ($2000 bond as a prerequisite to pursuing a claim in court
violates the Arizona constitution), See generaly Comment, supra note 67, at 89-97; Lockaby,
supra note 87, at 624-26.

requiring him to litigate complicated and expensive malpractice
cases twice. 148 State courts have unanimously refused to hold mediation panel legislation unconstitutional on this ground, 149 and the
approach of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on this issue is typical.
A party's right of free access to the courts in Pennsylvania is
derived from article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in
his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due
course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in
such manner and in such cases as the legislature may by law
direct. '50
In Smith Case, '5' the supreme court upheld the constitutionality
of the Pennsylvania compulsory civil arbitration statute, 152 interpreting the jury trial and free access to the courts guarantees as requiring
only that a jury trial be made available at some point before the
rights of the parties are finally determined. 53 The Parker court reasoned that a trial de novo from an arbitration panel hearing is adequate protection of the right to jury trial if the appeal is "not
burdened by the imposition of onerous conditions, restrictions or
54
regulations which would make the right practically unavailable."1

Thus, in Parker and Mattos, the issue before the supreme court was
whether the requirement that litigants try malpractice claims twice in
order to obtain a jury trial imposed an onerous condition that made
the right to jury trial practically unavailable. 155
Faced with this issue, the supreme court made the questionable
finding that the added expense of an appeal was not imposed by the
148. See Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 46-52, Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421
A.2d 190 (1980); Appendix to Brief of Amicus Pennsylvania Medical Society at 15-17, Parker
v. Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978).
149. See Lockaby, supra note 87, at 624-26.
150. PA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
151. 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625 (1955).
152. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 21-81 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
153. 381 Pa. at 230, 112 A.2d at 629.
154. 483 Pa. at 119, 394 A.2d at 939.
155. Pennsylvania case law defning "onerous condition" is both sparse and contradictory.
McDonald v. Schell, 6 Serg. & Raw. 239 (1820) held that imposing costs or bail for costs as a
condition precedent to jury trial did not constitute an onerous condition, even though such
requirements substantially burdened the exercise of the right to jury trial. Similarly, Gottschall v. Campbell, 234 Pa. 347, 361, 83 A. 286, 291 (1912) held that requiring the payment of a
jury fee in advance of trial did not constitute an onerous burden. Pennsylvania courts have
not been sympathetic to claims that arbitration expense may increase to the point of abrogating the right to trial. In McDonald v. Schell, 6 Serg. & Rawl.239, 240-41 (1820), the court
stated that "[t]he law may undoubtedly, in certain cases, bear so hard on a poor man, as almost
to deprive him of his appeal; but that will not justify the court in deciding that the law is void.
All general laws operate with severity in particular instances." The refusal to interpret added
expense as an onerous condition is difficult to reconcile with the holding in Dickerson v. Hudson, 233 Pa. Super. Ct. 413, 423, 302 A.2d 444, 448 (1973) (requiring proof that an appeal is
taken in good faith is an onerous condition).

statute but by the party who brought the appeal. 156 The court stated
that appellants' argument rested on the erroneous assumption that
there would be a need for the second proceeding to obtain a fair
recovery for the injured party's loss. Act 111 mandates that the
panel determine compensatory and punitive damages, thus precluding the absolute need for a subsequent trial to determine the amount
of recovery. The court held that there was no basis for concluding
that awards rendered in arbitration would not fully compensate the
victim. Moreover, the Act mandates insurance reforms that virtually
assure the satisfaction of any award. 5 '
The court's reasoning on this issue is strained, and it is more
likely that the decision is based on a quidpro quo theory. Although
the General Assembly substantially restricted the right to trial by
jury by adding the arbitration procedure, it provided a reasonable
substitute for that right by establishing what was thought to be a
speedy and inexpensive dispute resolution mechanism.' 5 8 The idea
that due process requires a reasonable substitute originated in dictum in New York Central Railroad v. White. 'I The quidpro quo
doctrine has been criticized by courts and commentators 60 but is
still valid in Pennsylvania. The court's rejection of appellants' free
access argument was predictable in light of Singer v. Sheppard'6'
Singer upheld the validity of Pennsylvania's no-fault motor vehicle
insurance statute, 162 which eliminated tort actions for certain classes
of accident victims. The court based that decision on a finding that
the legislature substituted prompt, certain recovery of economic loss
16 3
Simifor the delay and uncertainty that accompanies a lawsuit.
larly, in Parker, the court was "satisfied that any theoretical burden
upon the victim's right to trial by jury is counterbalanced by the substantial advantages provided to him or her under the Act."'"
E

Right to Trial by Jury

Every state constitution contains a provision that guarantees the
right to trial by jury. In Pennsylvania, article I, section 6 provides
156. 483 Pa. at 118, 394 A.2d at 939.
157. Id
158. See Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 868-69, 555 P.2d 399, 408-09
(1976).
159. 243 U.S. 188 (1917). "[Ilt perhaps may be doubted whether the state could abolish all
rights of action on the one hand, or all defenses on the other, without setting up something
adequate in their stead." Id at 201.
160. See, e.g., Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 869, 555 P.2d 409 (1976); Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d 444, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1975); Redish, Legislative
Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis. Constitutional Implications, 55 TEx. L.
REv. 759 (1977).
161. 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897 (1975).
162. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.301 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
163. 464 Pa. at 401, 346 A.2d at 904.
164. 483 Pa. at 120, 394 A.2d at 939.

that "[t]rial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate." '6 5 In challenging legislation affecting the right to a
jury trial, litigants must rely upon applicable state constitutional provisions because the right to trial by jury in civil cases, guaranteed by
the seventh amendment to the United States Constitution, has not
been applied to the states. 66 Appellants in Parker and Malos
raised two arguments supporting their assertion that the arbitration
system violated plaintiffs' right to a trial by jury.
First, appellants argued that section 510 of the Act was unconstitutional. 16 7 Section 510 provides that "[w]here an appeal is taken
the decision, and findings of fact, if any, of the arbitration panel
shall be admissible as evidence before the court; provided, however,
' 68
that any award of damages shall not be admissible as evidence."'
Appellants argued that the jury would be so influenced by the findings of the arbitration panel that it would not render its own verdict.
The supreme court dispensed with this argument in Parker and relied on its ruling in Smith Case, which interpreted article I, section 6
as requiring only that a jury trial be afforded prior to a final determination of the respective rights of the parties. Because section 510
neither gives the panel's decision the status of a presumption, 169 nor
shifts the burden of going forward with evidence, nor alters the burden of persuasion, the jury remains the final arbiter of the facts
presented.'70 Although article I, section 6 requires that a trial de
novo allow for the "full consideration of the case anew,"' 1 7 1 it does
165. PA. CONST.art. I, § 6.
166. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974).
167. See Reply Brief of Appellants Parker, Garcia, and Bost, Jr. at 1-16, Brief for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania at 28-35, Brief of Amicus Pennsylvania Medical Society at 15-2 1,
Parker v. Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978).
168. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.510 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). Presumably, the legislature included section 510 to deter appeals of frivolous claims and to encourage out-of-court
settlements. Without the admissibility of the panel decision, both parties might consider the
hearing an incidental exercise. See Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657
(1977); State ex rel Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
169. In Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978), the Maryland

Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of a provision in the Maryland medical malpractice mediation statute that clothed the arbitration panel's decision with a presumption of correctness at a trial de novo. See generally Comment, supra note 67.
170. The Parker court relied upon Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 412 (1915).
In Meeker, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a statutory provision making the findings
of fact and the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission prima facie evidence of facts at
subsequent court proceedings.
The provision establishes a rebuttable presumption. It cuts off no defense, interposes
no obstacles to a full contestation of all the issues, and takes no question of fact from
either the court or jury. At most, therefore, it is merely a rule of evidence. It does not
abridge the right of trial by jury, or take away any of its incidents.
Id at 430. See Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977). See also Exparte

Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920); State ex rel Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d

434 (1978).
171. Parker v. Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. at 123-24, 394 A.2d at 941. See generally Note,
Arbitration-CompulsoryArbitration in Pennsylvania-Arbitration Act-De Novo Appeals, 16
DUQ. L. REV. 443 (1977-78).

not restrict the type of evidence that may be presented to a jury.
Therefore the legislature could properly provide for the admissibility
of the panel decision.
The supreme court's ruling on this issue is consistent with its
previous holding in Commonwealth Y.Harmon,17 2 which found that
the right of an appeal for a trial de novo does not embrace the right
to relitigate a pretrial suppression motion, even when the evidence
admitted under the pretrial ruling "might have a significant impact
upon the ultimate verdict.""' 3 Both Parker and Harmon support the
widely accepted view that no vested right exists in a rule of evidence,
and that it is the legislature's prerogative to change evidentiary
rules.' 74 In Exparte Peterson, 175 the United States Supreme Court
held that the modification of a rule of evidence to allow the admissibility of a court-appointed auditor's report as prima facie evidence of
findings of fact did not contravene the federal constitutional right to
trial by jury.
The command of the Seventh Amendment that the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved does not require that old forms of practice and procedure be retained. It does not prohibit the introduction of new methods for determining what facts are actually in
issue, nor does it prohibit the introduction of new rules of evidence .... New devices may be used to adopt the ancient instituof it an efficient instrument in
tion to present needs and to make
76
the administration of justice.'

The provision of Act 111 that allows the panel decision to be admitted into evidence at trial is an evidentiary change entirely within the
legislature's authority.
Appellants' second argument in Parker and Mattos asserted
that "[tihe arbitration process created by Act 111 is filled with such
interminabledelay that it violates the guarantees in the state constitu172. 469 Pa. 490, 366 A.2d 895 (1976).
173. Id at 496, 366 A.2d at 898. The court distinguished Harmon from its ruling in Commonwealth v. Archambault, 448 Pa. 90, 290 A.2d 72 (1972), which held that a trial court is not
permitted to express its views on the guilt or innocence of the accused in criminal trials. In
Archambault, the court opined that the position of the judge in a criminal trial might compel
the jury to accept the court's view and prevent the exercise of the jury's independent judgment.
The Parker court found that the relationship of the arbitration panel to a jury in a trial de
novo did not justify a fear of coercion. The supreme court assumed that if the trial court
properly instructs the jury, the jury will perform its role as exclusive fact finder, regardless of
the admission into evidence of the panel's decision.
A New York trial court took a firm stand in support of the constitutionality of admitting
the panel's finding in Halpern v. Gozan, 85 Misc. 2d 753, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1976). The court
was certain that the jurors would remain objective, despite the admission of the panel decision:
"Historically, jurors for the most part have proven their independence. They guard their roles
with unique jealousy. They accept with obvious pride the admonitions of the trial court that
they are the 'sole judges of the facts."' Id at 759, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 748. Appellate courts have
followed the reasoning of the Haltern court. See, e.g., Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576,
581, 570 P.2d 744, 749 (1977).
174. See, ag., Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
175. 253 U.S. 300 (1920).
176. Id at 309-10.

tion of access to the courts, justice without delay, and the right to

jury trials.""'

Thus, the supreme court was squarely confronted

with the issue of whether delay itself is an onerous condition that
makes the right to a jury trial practically unavailable in violation of
article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.' 7 8 The Parker
court was willing to grant the legislature an opportunity to fully implement and amend the Act despite substantial evidence of delay in
processing malpractice claims. Nevertheless, less than two years
later, in Mattos, the court lost patience with the legislature and concluded that "the lengthy delay occasioned by the arbitration system
therein does in fact burden the right of jury trial with onerous conditions, restrictions or regulations which . . . make the right practically unavailable."' 79 Accordingly, section 309 of the Act, granting
the Arbitration Panels for Health Care original and exclusive jurisdiction, was declared unconstitutional.
The supreme court's invalidation of section 309 was untimely
and based upon questionable reasoning. The statistics indicating delay in the arbitration system were serious,' but they did not demonstrate that plaintiffs were "clearly,palpably, andplainly" denied the
right to trial by jury.'8 ' The court based its finding of extreme delay
upon the fact that 75 percent of the 2,909 cases filed as of December
31, 1979 remained unresolved 82 and did not fairly consider that
nearly half of these claims had been filed in 1979.183 Although the
court criticized the fact that only fourteen panel hearings had been
convened as of December 31, 1979, l 1 it failed to consider that panel
selection does not begin until one party files a certificate of readiness, 85 and only 134 certificates had ever been filed with the Administrator. 86 Furthermore, by September 30, 1980, one week after the
Mallos decision was filed, the number of cases disposed of by panel
decision had risen from fourteen to fifty-six, and 120 more cases
177.

491 Pa. 385, 388, 421 A.2d 190, 191 (1980). See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 29-

45.
178. PA. CONST. art. I, § 11. Case law interpreting this section is scarce. An early case
determined that judicially caused delay of sixteen weeks to sixteen months was a delay within
the meaning of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Commonwealth ex rel Duff v. Keenan, 347
Pa. 574, 33 A.2d 244 (1943). See also Exton Drive-In v. Home Indemnity Co., 436 Pa. 480, 261
A.2d 319 (1969).
179. 491 Pa. at 395, 421 A.2d at 195 (quoting Smith Case, 381 Pa. 223, 231, 112 A.2d 625,
629 (1955)).
180. 491 Pa. at 393, 421 A.2d at 194. Subsequent to assuming plenary jurisdiction over
Mattos, the supreme court transferred the case to the commonwealth court with a directive to
hold an evidentiary hearing to make findings of fact. The commonwealth court's findings were
then certified to the supreme court.
181. Tosto v. Pennsylvania Nursing Home Loan Agency, 460 Pa. 1, 16, 331 A.2d 198, 205
(1975) (quoting Daly v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 263, 271, 191 A.2d 835, 840 (1963)).
182. 491 Pa. at 393-95, 421 A.2d at 194.
183. Id
184. Id

185. See notes 57-64 and accompanying text suprz
186. 491 Pa. at 393, 421 A.2d at 194-95.

were pending for panel decision.I 7
The supreme court's conclusion was particularly unsound in
light of several significant adjustments to Act Ill that effectively assured litigants of a hearing within fifteen months of the initiation of
the action. 8 ' The Mattos majority indicated that its analysis included the effect of the recent amendments, but concluded that they
were "far too little, far too late."' 8 9 It is difficult to understand how
the court included the effects of the amendments since the most substantial revision to the arbitration procedure was not effective until
February 12, 1980,190 several months after the statistical compilation
utilized by the supreme court was completed.'
The most striking inconsistency in the Mattos decision was wellexpressed by Justice Roberts: "It is indeed curious that . . .after

judicially interring the Legislature's carefully amended arbitration
plan and ignoring the Legislature's judgment that the recent amendments to Act 111 will promptly resolve malpractice disputes, the majority then proceeds to extol the virtues of arbitration."'' 9 2 After
invalidating Section 309 of the Act, the supreme court stated that its
opinion should not be taken as a retreat from the long-held belief in
"arbitration as a viable, expeditious, alternative method of dispute
resolution."'' 93 Despite this dictum, the courts' holding that Act
I l's maximum fifteen month, pretrial arbitration system places an
unconstitutional burden on the right to jury trial casts doubt upon
the validity of the compulsory civil arbitration system, 194 which the
court upheld in Smith Case.195 The court's seemingly standardless
187. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, ARBITRATION PANELS FOR HEALTH CARE, September 30,
1980.
188. See notes 68-85 and accompanying text supra
189. 491 Pa. at 395-96 n.5, 421 A.2d at 195 n.5.
190. On February 12, 1980, the Administrator effected the following regulation:
In all actions commenced prior to the effective date of this section, the parties shall
file a certificate of readiness within one year after the effective date of this section. In
all actions commenced on or after the effective date of this section, the parties shall
file a certificate of readiness within one year after the commencement of the action.
37 PA. CODE § 171.123(a) (1981).
191. The evidentiary hearing conducted by the commonwealth court began on January
21, 1980. December 31, 1979, was "fixed as the cutoff date with respect to the statistical evidence, by stipulation or otherwise." Record, supra note 71, at 119(a). 37 PA. CODE
§ 171.123(a) was not effective until February 12, 1980.
192. Gregory v. Hazleton State Hosp., 491 Pa. 596, 597, 421 A.2d 1045, 1045 (1980) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
193. Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 396, 421 A.2d 190, 196 (1980) (quoting Parker v.
Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 120, 394 A.2d 932, 939-40 (1978) (emphasis added)).
194. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 7361 (Purdon Pamphlet 1981).
195. 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625 (1955). The civil arbitration system is similar in procedure
and purpose to Act 111 arbitration provisions. In both systems, parties must submit their
claims to an arbitration panel prior to any action in court. A trial de novo from the panel
decisions is afforded to all parties. Although civil suits with low damages are probably not as
complex as medical malpractice cases, the problems of impaneling three busy attorneys and of
repeated requests for continuances by counsel to the litigants remain. A constitutional attack
upon the civil arbitration system based upon delay of the right to jury trial is conceivable.

approach as illustrated in Parker,Mattos, and Smith Case, "can only

'bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a restricted
railroad ticket, good for this day and this train only.' "196
The effect that Mattos had on the entire arbitration system was

determined in an opinion by the Attorney General for the State of
Pennsylvania. The Attorney General declared that the Administrator could continue to accept and docket new complaints, rule on motions, hold hearings, and render decisions on new or pending cases,
if the consent of all parties to the jurisdiction of the arbitration

panels is obtained.' 97 If any defendant does not agree to arbitration
under the Act, the case shall be heard by the appropriate court of
common pleas.198 The Administrator was instructed to notify all

parties involved in pending claims of the opportunity for transfer to
the courts of common pleas.199 Nearly all cases pending before the
panels were subsequently transferred to the already overcrowded
20
2 °°
dockets of the courts of common pleas by election of the parties, '
thus leaving Pennsylvania with an elaborate but impotent arbitration

system.
196. 491 Pa. at 401, 421 A.2d at 198 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944)).
197. 10 PA. BULL. 4279-80 (1980). The Attorney General's judgment that only the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Act was declared unconstitutional was supported by the
separate opinion of Justice Larsen, who dissented in part precisely because the majority did
not void the entire arbitration scheme. Additionally, the Attorney General's opinion was supported by § 1007.1 of the Act, which states that "the provisions of this Act are declared to be
severable," PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.1007.1 (Purdon Supp. 1981-82), and by the Statutory
Construction Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1925 (Purdon 1981-82), which provides that if a
section of a statute is invalidated, the remainder of the act stands unless the court finds that the
invalidated sections are essential to the otherwise valid sections. See also Stoner v. Presbyterian Univ. Hosp., 609 F.2d 109, 112 (3d Cir. 1979).
198. Sections 1301.401 and 1301.605 of the Act toll the running of the statute of limitations upon the filing of the complaint with the Administrator. Thus, no fatal prejudice will
result from the transfer of cases that have been filed with the arbitration panels. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.401, 1301.605 (Purdon Supp. 1981-82).
199. The Administrator's notification is published at 10 PA. BULL. 4278-79 (1980).
200. Justice Roberts recognized the burden that has been placed upon the common pleas
courts.
The cases remanded today are only the beginning of an avalanche of cases
which will be descending upon our trial courts and adding to their already heavy
caseloads. Surely it must be clear that these disputes would be more promptly resolved through the amended arbitration procedures.
Not only malpractice litigants but all other litigants in our trial courts will be
required unnecessarily to wait still longer for the resolution of their disputes. Regrettably, with the untimely demise of the Legislature's amended arbitration plan, there
will be not less, but more delay.
Gregory v. Hazleton State Gen. Hosp., 491 Pa. 596, 597, 421 A.2d 1045, 1045-46 (1980).
201. As of January 5, 1981, 1,881 cases were transferred from the arbitration system to
common pleas courts. Memorandum from Donna Turner to Arthur S. Frankston, Administrator of Arbitration Panels for Health Care (January 6, 1981).

V. Amendments to Act 111 Arbitration Provisions: Alternatives
and Recommendations
A. A New Malpractice Crisis?
Despite its adjudged failure, many believe that Act IIl accomplished its purpose by making malpractice insurance available to
physicians through various mechanisms.202 The Pennsylvania Trial
Lawyers Association2 "3 and the Medico-Legal Committee of the
Pennsylvania Bar Association 2°4 have called for the repeal of Act
111, with the exception of those provisions dealing directly with insurance availability and the Catastrophe Loss Fund.
Total abandonment of medical malpractice arbitration in Pennsylvania would be imprudent. Although the threat of a new malpractice crisis was widely regarded as a remote possibility only a few
years ago, the latest statistics issued by medical societies and insurance companies "forecast a scenario strikingly similar to 1975. "2o5

There has been a dramatic increase in the number of malpractice
20 7
claims filed, 2" a steady upsurge in the size of malpractice awards,
and an astronomical rise in the cost of professional liability
insurance.2 o8
202. See notes 36-45 and accompanying text supran
203. See Memorandum on Senate Bill 846 (September 25, 1979) (unpublished analysis of
Senate Bill 846 by Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association).
204. Report of Medico-Legal Committee of the Pennsylvania Bar Association (unpublished report submitted by the Committee at its July 16, 1979 meeting in Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania).
205. P. CARLIN, supra note 22, at 6. Physicians and medical malpractice insurance companies benefit most from mediation panel legislation.
206. The St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, the country's largest underwriter
of malpractice insurance, reports that claims against its policyholders during 1979 have risen
13% since 1977. P. CARLIN, supra note 22, at 6-7. See Chapman, Is Another Crisis Looming,
Nat'l L.J., Feb. 4, 1980, at 34, col. 3; Medical World News, Nov. 12, 1979, at 11, col. 2. The
most recent statistics concerning claims filed in Pennsylvania also illustrate the sharp increase
in malpractice claims. In 1977, only 422 claims were fied in Pennsylvania against health care
providers. In 1979, a total of 1,273 claims were filed. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 68.

207. The size of jury awards and out-of-court settlements have increased drastically. The
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) recently released a 600 page study
of 72,000 medical malpractice claims settled by 128 insurers from July 1975 through December
1978. The study revealed that the average indemnity payment per injury increased 70%during
that period. After adjusting for inflation, the NAIC determined that the individual injury
award was 72% higher by the end of 1970 as compared with the mid-1970's. The NAIC study
indicated that large court settlements are the primary reason for increasing indemnity payments. Million dollar awards are becoming more common. In 1975, only five awards over one
million dollars were reported. By 1978, twenty-three awards exceeded one million dollars.
More importantly, the NAIC study indicated that more malpractice suits were settled by the
courts. In 1975, only 7%of the malpractice suits filed went to court. By 1978, 18% of all claims
were litigated. Moreover, 43% of all reported settlements were reached after a complaint was
filed, or after a trial was under way. Barnett, Malpractice Awards Climbing, J. of Commerce,
June 26, 1980, at 18, col. 4. See generally, P. CARLIN, supra note 22, at 6-7; BUSINESS WEEK,
Nov. 12, 1979, at 40. In Pennsylvania, the average settlement for malpractice claims from 1976
to 1980 was $49,471, exceeding the NAIC computed average by $15,000. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 68.

208. The most startling increases have occurred in malpractice insurance premiums. The

The possibility of another malpractice crisis makes it imperative
that the problems inherent in Act I l's arbitration provisions be resolved. The success or failure of the arbitration system may have a
significant impact on the future availability of medical malpractice
insurance in Pennsylvania. Statutory and administrative modifications to Act 111 can substantially improve the panel system and enable it to withstand supreme court scrutiny.
B. Alternatives andRecommendations
By 1981, twenty-six states had adopted some form of screening
panel or arbitration mechanism for the handling of medical malpractice claims. 2°9 All of the mechanisms share similar legislative
goals: (1) reduction of the volume of unmeritorious litigation; (2)
encouragement of prompt disposition of meritorious claims before
litigation; and (3) reduction of the cost of medical care as a result of
lower insurance costs."' Each of these states has enacted its own
form of pretrial mediation and have met with varied degrees of success. Exploration of the variations upon the basic provisions intrinsic to all medical malpractice mediation panels assists in determining
how to effectively amend Act 111.
1. Submission of Claims.-The supreme court's holding in
Mattos clearly did not preclude reinstatement of the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of arbitration or screening panels. Moreover,
the court seemed to invite a second attempt by the legislature when it
stated that Mattos should not be taken "as a retreat from our longheld belief in 'arbitration as a viable, expeditious, alternative method
of dispute resolution.' . . . Our conclusion merely indicates the in-

ability of this statutoryscheme to provide an effective alternative dispute resolution forum in the area of medical malpractice."2''
Presumably, Act 111 will withstand the supreme court test of constitutionality if the General Assembly can successfully extract from the
Act those provisions that tend to foster delay. 2
The experience of states that operate voluntary systems leads to
St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company reports that it has substantially increased the
rates of roughly 44,000 physicians. For example, a Minnesota general practitioner who performed no surgery paid $1,014 in 1976. By 1979, his premium rates increased to $2,037-a
100% increase over three years. As of April 1980, it is reported that the same physician has
been assessed an additional 30% increase. St. Paul further estimates that rates for specialists,
such as orthopedic surgeons, are increasing nearly three times as fast as those for general
practitioners. P. CARLiN, supra note 22, at 6-7.
209. See note 9 supra
210. Because physicians pass the increased cost of malpractice insurance to health care
consumers, the cost of medical care has increased dramatically. See note 22 supra.
211. 491 Pa. 385, 391, 421 A.2d 190, 196 (quoting Flightways Corp. v. Keystone Helicopter Corp., 459 Pa. 660, 662-63, 331 A.2d 184, 195 (1975) (emphasis added)). See notes 177-196
and accompanying text supra
212. See notes 165-201 and accompanying text supra

the conclusion that Pennsylvania's pretrial mediation system must be
compulsory to be effective. In the seven states that mandate voluntary screening panels, underutilization has been the rule.2 1 3 In Arkansas, for example, the entire voluntary mediation system was
dismantled because not a single screening panel was employed since
the arbitration system was established in 1975.214 Similarly, states
that employ voluntary, binding arbitration systems initiated by pretreatment agreements have experienced limited success in preventing
litigation.2 15 Pennsylvania itself represents another state in which
the voluntary arbitration system suffers from disuse. A voluntary arbitration system certainly will not be successful in achieving any of
the legislature's purposes. Any claimant with a case of questionable
merit will waive the system hoping to fare better before an entirely
lay jury, as opposed to a panel with a medical expert. A mandatory
arbitration system is the only effective means to combat the medical
malpractice insurance crisis.
2 Administration.-The creation of the Office of the Administrator to implement the arbitration provisions of Pennsylvania's Act
is unique. In nearly every state, medical mediation panels are administered either by the court system or within the Department of
Insurance.21 6
Vesting of the administrative responsibilities of the arbitration
panels has a direct effect on the speed with which claims are
processed. The creation of a central office to implement the arbitration provisions has several positive features. Under Act 111, all motions, complaints, and answers are conveniently filed with the
Administrator by certified mail. The Administrator's office developed an expertise in prehearing motions that enabled the office to
provide responses to litigants more expeditiously than would be possible in courts of common pleas.2 17 The Administrator's responses to
motions produced a uniform statewide standard for medical malpractice litigation. The motions practice of the Administrator's office
relieved the common pleas court of the immense burden of motions
work, which is one of the most time consuming aspects of medical
213. P. CARLIN, supra note 22, at 37.
214. Id
215. Pretreatment agreements refer to contracts between a doctor and a patient under
which both parties agree to submit any claim that may arise in the course of treatment to an
arbitration panel. These agreements will not be enforced if it is shown that the agreement to
arbitrate was not voluntarily or knowingly entered into, or that the contract was one of adhesion. Arford, The Latest on Michigan's Arbitration System with Typical Questions Answered,
MICHIGAN MEDICINE, April 1978, at 209.

216. P. CARL.IN, supra note 22, at 17.
217. A statistical study of the period from August 1, 1979, to September 14, 1979 showed
that 72% of the motions filed with the Administrator's office were disposed of within twenty
.days, an additional 14% within forty days, and 13% required no action. Memorandum, supra
note 50, at 15-16.

malpractice litigation.2"' Finally, the Administrator's handling of
prehearing motions reduced the costs incurred by litigants.21 9
Another positive aspect of maintaining a centrally located Administrator's office is that it facilitates the gathering of statewide statistics concerning medical malpractice cases. Statewide statistics
provide a risk management tool for insurers and health care providers that would not be readily available in a system operated on a
county basis.22 ° The statewide system also expedites the medical licensing board's investigation of negligent health care providers. 2 2 1
The primary problem of a separate office for the administration
of arbitration provisions is the lack of power vested in the Administrator. Act 111 does not give the Administrator contempt powers
equivalent to those possessed by a common pleas judge. The Administrator has no authority to speed cases or to control uncooperative counsel.22 2 The Administrator has also found that the authority
given to the chairperson of the panel is an impediment. In his 1980
Annual Report to the Governor, the Administrator complained that
he could not control chairpersons who granted continuances because
they had to "practice with these fellows, or [chairpersons] who
lagged in scheduling a prehearing conference or hearing because of
[their] own busy practice, or who appointed a medical expert witness
to testify when a plaintiff was unable to secure 23one and ordered the
2
Administrator to pay the fee for the witness.
These shortcomings impede the quick resolution of claims. For
the arbitration system to operate properly, litigants, their counsel,
and arbitrators must be cooperative. 224 This problem can be resolved in one of two manners. First, the General Assembly could
amend Act 111 to provide the Administrator with greater authority.
Second, Act 111 could be amended to place the impaneling of arbi218.

In his 1980 Annual Report to the Governor, the Administrator stated,

The fact that we eased the burden of motion practice for the judges of the courts of
common pleas enabled them to accelerate the disposition of other cases and to improve the statistics measuring the time between filing
of a complaint and a trial. It
should be noted thatfor Philadelhia alone, our office handledover 1,400 cases which
would have been assigned to the over-burdened judges there.
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR ARBITRATION PANELS FOR HEALTH CARE at

11-12 (1980) (emphasis added).
219. The Administrator does not require oral arguments on motions; most controversies

over motions are decided on briefs alone, thus decreasing costs. If an oral argument is requested by either party, it is held by a telephone conference call between the attorneys and the
Administrator. Record, supra note 71, at 99.
220. Record, supra note 71, at 33-34.
221. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
222. Senate Bill 88, which was referred to the Pennsylvania Department of Public Health
and Welfare on January 26, 1981, provides for contempt powers to deal with uncooperative
witnesses. S.B. 88, 1981 Sess. § 307. See 37 PA. CODE § 171.144 (1981).
223. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR ARBITRATION PANELS FOR HEALTH
CARE at 15 (1980).
224. See Record, supra note 71, at 98.

trators and the scheduling of hearings within the purview of the
court. The latter is the more practical solution because it enhances
the positive attributes of the Administrator's Office by operating that
office in conjunction with the authority of the courts, and it avoids
the constitutional problems raised by the separation of powers
doctrine. 25
Act 111 should require all medical malpractice claims to be filed
initially with the Arbitration Panels of Health Care.226 The Administrator's office should continue to exercise its expertise in pretrial
motions, but the problems and delays experienced by the Administrator can best be resolved by the courts. The Administrator should
handle all claims up to the filing of a certificate of readiness, but
subsequently the appropriate court of common pleas, with the benefit of contempt powers, should select panels and schedule hearings.
In this manner, the mediation system would retain the positive aspect of maintaining a central office to track the progress of all malpractice claims filed in the Commonwealth.
3. Mediation Panels.-Panel selection procedures under the
various malpractice mediation statutes are very similar.227 Generally, panel members are chosen after a claim is filed with a court or
an administrator, and after the defendant has responded. Most statutes provide that panelists are selected from lists submitted by the
medical society or bar association within the state. Selection is usually performed by both parties or the panel administrator. Pennsylvania is one of the few states in which the panel administrator
selects panels from his own lists. 228 Both parties are normally allowed several peremptory challenges and an opportunity to object to
any panelist for cause.229
Under the mediation panel administration system recommended in the previous section, Act Ill should be amended to require lists of potential panelists to be submitted to the common pleas
courts by the Pennsylvania Medical Society and the Pennsylvania
Bar Association. The provision in Act I1I allowing each party one
peremptory challenge and unlimited challenges for cause should be
retained to preclude a procedural due process attack upon the
system.23 °
The size and composition of mediation panels varies greatly
225. See notes 109-119 and accompanying text supra
226. See note 8 supra.
227. For a comprehensive compilation of state panel selection procedures, see P. CARLnN,
supra note 22, at 17.
228. In Arkansas, Tennessee, and Maine, panel members are chosen from preselected

master panels. Id
229. Id
230. See notes 134-138 and accompanying text supra

among the states. Fourteen states employ three-member panels, and
twelve states call for panels ranging in size from four to seven members. 23' Nearly every state requires at least one health care provider
panelist to be of the same class and specialty as the defendant.2 3 2
Pennsylvania's experimentation with panel size definitely indi233
cated that the three-member panel system was most expeditious.
Therefore, the size of the mediation panel established by the
amended Act should be retained. The composition of the panel,
however, must be amended. The panel should be chaired by a common pleas judge, and the judge should be empowered to rule on any
procedural or evidentiay problems that occur during the hearing.
The presence of a judge who is dispositionally oriented can reasonably be expected to facilitate settlements.2 3 4 In appeals taken from
the mediation finding, a different judge should be appointed to preside over the trial de novo. This practice will preserve appellant's
right to a trial by jury by providing for a true trial de novo before a
judge who has not already decided liability and damages.23 5 In addition to the trial judge, an attorney and health care provider should
sit on the panel,2 36 and the health care provider should be of the
same class and specialty as the defendant. 237 The presence of a physician of the same specialty facilitates the hearing procedure because
each party can be assured that the evidence it presents is fully comprehended by the p.nel.
4. Hearings and Proceedings.-The provision of Act 111 that
requires the parties to comply with formal rules of evidence and civil
procedure contributed most to the delay in processing claims. The
provision effectively precluded operation of a nonadversary panel
system that could foster a more relaxed and equitable atmosphere in
which the chance for settlement would be greatly enhanced.2 3 8
231. For a compilation of the size and composition of various state mediation panels, see
P. CARLIN, supra note 22, at 18.
232. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1980).
233. See notes 68-85 and accompanying text upra
234. "The e;ieriences of those states which contain active panel chairmen shows that the
effectiveness of a screening panel hinges on the individual practices and temperament of that
chairman. Panel chairmen must be provided with broad powers to control panel proceedings
so that hearings c; n be completed promptly." P. CARLIN, supra note 22, at 40.
235. See noteb 167-176 and accompanying text supra.
236. It is not necessary to retain a layperson panel member. The mediation hearing is not
a trial per se and is not subject to the strictures attendant upon jury trials. See notes 134-138
and accompanying text supra
237. See note 236 supra To provide for an expeditious hearing process, the rules of the

common pleas court should provide that prior to the date set for the hearing, both parties shall
submit to the court all written materials, including medical and hospital reports and pleadings.
These materials should be made available to all panel members prior to the hearing and
should also be made available to the county medical society. The medical society can then
designate the medical specialty involved and provide its list of potential panel members
accordingly.
238. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 11, at 89-96.

Twenty-three of the twenty-six states that operate mediation panels
conduct hearings on an informal basis.2 39
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Parker and Mattos, expressed its approval of informal arbitration proceedings as long as
both parties are given an opportunity to be heard.2 4 ° Act 111 should
be amended to provide for informal proceedings in which each party
is granted an opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. The informality of the hearing procedure will enable the presiding judge to move cases promptly toward settlement or final
determination. 24 ' A mediation system that places strong emphasis
on pretrial settlement will infringe on the litigants' right to trial by
jury, but will not create an onerous burden that makes the right to
jury trial practically unavailable.2 4 2
5. Time Limits.-Because

the Mattos court found that Act

I l's maximum fifteen month, pretrial mediation system was an unconstitutional burden upon the right to trial by jury,243 Act 11 1 must
be amended to mandate panel determinations within a shorter period of time. 2 " State mediation panel legislation places varying time
limitations on the hearing process.24 5 Some states simply require
panel decisions to be rendered within a reasonable time.2 46 Other
states allow as long as ninety days from the commencement of the
hearing.24 7
In Montana, one of seven states that report a high degree of
success with the panel system, 24 8 no hearing can commence more
than 120 days from the date an action is filed. 249 Hearings are con-

ducted on an informal and confidential basis. The panel determines
liability and may recommend damages.2 50 This mandatory system,
239. See P. CARLIN, supra note 22, at 22.
240. See notes 134-136 and accompanying text supra.
241. Arizona enacted Uniform Rules of Procedure for Medical Liability Review Panels to
supplement the state's statutory provisions. These rules stipulate in detail the procedures to be
followed prior to the hearing. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567 (Supp. 1981).
242. See notes 147-164 and accompanying text supra
243. Id
244. The supreme court did not define the parameters of a constitutionally permissible
time period.
245. For a discussion of the various state time limits see P. CARLIN, supra note 22, at 21,
33-34.
246. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1980).
247. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981).
248. P. CARLIN, supra note 22, at 5.
249. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 17-1305 (Supp. 1979). For a discussion of the practical
application of the Montana time limitations see P. CARLIN, supra note 22, at 34. See generally
Gibbs, The Montana Planfor Screening Medical Malfractice Claims, 36 MONT. L. REv. 321
(1975).
250. Act 111 's mediation system should continue to require panels to determine damages
so that a constitutional attack based on a free access or quidpro quo argument can be avoided.
See notes 147.164 and accompanying text supra

similar to Massachusetts' proceedings, 25 1 performs the role of a
screening device; Act l II's system provided for the full litigation of
claims. Medical negligence actions of questionable merit are exposed under Montana's screening process and are seldom pursued.
Because Pennsylvania must restrict the length of any future
mandatory mediation system, the emphasis must necessarily be on
the expeditious screening of nonmeritorious malpractice claims.
This can only be accomplished by relaxing the rules of evidence and
civil procedure, and by strict adherence to time limits similar to
those provided under the Montana mediation system. The liberal
use of contempt powers vested in the common pleas court will encourage uncooperative parties to adhere to the time limits mandated
by the General Assembly. Finally, the prompt scheduling of a case
for a trial de novo can be facilitated by a provision in the rules of the
common pleas courts that would permit the simultaneous filing of all
medical malpractice claims with the Administrator and the court.252
This practice would lessen the burden on the right to trial by jury.
VI. Conclusion
The overall effect of Act Ill has been the cure of many of the
symptoms of the medical malpractice insurance crisis. The insurance provisions of the Act and the Catastrophe Loss Fund make it
virtually certain that every physician practicing in Pennsylvania will
have insurance available at reasonable rates, thus assuring victims of
medical negligence of compensation for their injuries. The arbitration provisions of Act 111 relieved the overburdened court system of
nearly 4,000 complicated medical malpractice claims. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's untimely return of these cases will produce greater delay in processing claims.
An efficient pretrial screening system for medical malpractice
cases is essential if the continued increase in the costs of medical care
and malpractice insurance is to be slowed. Even a system designed
to meet the constitutional objections of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court will fail, however, without the respect and cooperation of the
Coiimonwealth's Medical Society and Bar Association. Lack of cooperation was a major factor in the demise of the Arbitration Panels
for Health Care. A revised mediation system, which seeks the participation of Pennsylvania's Medical Society and Bar Association,
can ameliorate the problems underlying the medical malpractice in251. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60B (Michie/Law Co-op Cum. Supp. 1981). See
generally McLaughlin, A Look at the MassachusettsMalfpractice TribunalSystem, 3 AM. J.L.
MED. 197 (1977).
252. For a discussion of the docketing procedures employed for medical malpractice cases
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, see the testimony of Judge Greenberg
in the Mattos Hearing. See also Record, supra note 71, at 124a-206a.

surance crisis. The system must be compulsory and settlement oriented, and should combine the positive aspects of the Arbitration
Panels for Health Care with the traditional authority of the courts.
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